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Morality looms large in our lives. We all note its gravity and can explain some 
conception, however vague, of its tenets. Morality represents those aspects of our lives 
we consider most meaningful. For all this importance, however, morality has no 
heteronymous force over us. Unlike physical forces, such as gravity, to which we must 
acquiesce, in accord with our wills or against them, morality cannot make us act in any 
certain way. Unlike arguments of science, backed by mathematical formulas and 
experimental proofs, morality can only persuade us to adhere to its claims to the extent 
we are willing to listen and be persuaded.
This tenuous mix of gravity and seeming powerlessness has encouraged many thinkers 
to argue for some conception of a secure foundation for morality. Two of these thinkers, 
offering two very different approaches, are Immanuel Kant and Martha Nussbaum. Kant 
seeks to ground morality in the objective and unchanging a priori foundation of reason. 
Nussbaum redirects the moral moment to the concrete and tangible lived particulars of 
our actual lives. Each, however, focuses on too narrow a foundation, thus failing to 
provide moral guidance that accurately reflects both the gravity and richness we associate 
with the moral life. Kant and Nussbaum commit the errors of rational reductionism and 
empirical reductionism, respectively.
In contrast to the moral methods of Kant and Nussbaum, centered coherence provides a 
foundation for morality that does not suffer from the same critique of reductionism. 
Instead, it describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral guidance and 
reflects the gravity and the meaning we recognize in morality.
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1. Introduction: The Force of Morality
Bernard Williams opens his book Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy with a 
question posed by Socrates in Plato’s Republic: How should one live?1 It is not a light 
question.
Socrates thought it of the utmost importance, and his dialogues continually probe 
for clues to the answers. Each of his encounters narrows the range of possible 
suggestions. The answers proposed by philosophers since Socrates reflect the weight 
Socrates associated with the question. These answers are heavy, often struggling, and too 
often freighted with the metaphysical and epistemological baggage of philosophical 
argument. As the title of his book suggests, Williams concludes that philosophy cannot 
fully address Socrates’ question in a way that meets the standards it has set for itself.
Yet, philosophy has never been able to cease addressing and debating the 
question. Each major philosophical school has paid and pays tribute to morality, even if 
only to argue against the possibility of any such system. Following Plato, Aristotle wrote 
the comprehensive and scientific Ethics. Aquinas’s theological metaphysics, Hume’s 
skepticism, Kant’s critical method, and Nietzsche’s indictment of religious pessimism, to 
name a few, all provide examinations of morality. In the twentieth century, positivism 
sought to excise intangibles from what we consider meaningful. Even the 
poststructuralists, after deconstructing every foundation for hegemonic thinking, attempt 
to argue for moral positions, although, ironically, their deconstruction attempts can be 
attributed to preconceived moral notions. More recently, moral philosophers such as 
Martha Nussbaum have sought a different approach. Agreeing with Williams that 
philosophy cannot fully answer Socrates’ question, she rejects the traditional methods of
1
philosophical discourse as insufficient for addressing moral concerns in favor of the rich 
and descriptive medium of fiction.
It is an interesting question why the intellectual and cultural history of the west 
places great importance on morality. Why if, as Williams and many other philosophers 
conclude, explanations and defenses of morality are not fully compatible with 
philosophical argument, does it still receive so much attention by philosophers and even 
more attention by society?
At the institutional level, moral language is evident in every context. It is nearly 
impossible to listen to a politician speak without hearing words such as “values” and 
“integrity.” Businesses convene ethics committees and task forces. Non-profits in every 
town strive to fill in the gaps to create a “better” society, however their mission 
statements define this, and philanthropic foundations gladly keep them funded. These 
foundations have no technical or legal obligation to give out massive quantities of their 
money, yet they choose to toil over thousands of grant applications to fund an incredibly 
wide range of non-profit activity instead of accumulating wealth for personal use.
At the individual level, people seek moral guidance from syndicated columnists 
such as Randy Cohen of the New York Times Magazine or Abigail Van Buren (now 
succeeded by her daughter). People seek moral advice from religious and non-religious 
sources, such as churches and self-help retreats. Books tell people how to handle every 
aspect of their lives, such as how to responsibly spend and invest their money (with a 
myriad of authors offering an equal number of definitions of “responsible”), how to 
respect their partners, and how to instill values in their children. Everywhere we look,
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there is some form of discussion about morality. Evidently, as Williams also claims, the 
insufficiency of philosophy to fully address morality is not the final word on the subject.
We must ask why morality has such a hold on people, both scholars and non­
scholars. If philosophy cannot offer a sufficient account for morality, why is it so 
beholden to it? Perhaps more importantly, what is the place of morality in human life 
that it represents the primary area of overlapping interest between the academic and non- 
academic worlds? It would be nothing short of hyperbole to say that the general public 
has any interest in the majority of topics discussed among philosophers. Factual 
anecdotes about quantum mechanics or a general discussion of skepticism and security of 
knowledge might provide interesting dinner party conversation, but to probe either at a 
deeper level, such as a presentation of material from original sources on the subject, 
would quickly erode interest.
A discussion of morality, however, whether in the form of political theories, 
economic disparities, or justifications for individual actions receives a very different 
response. People engage in discussions about priorities for the government’s allocation 
of money. Unlike other philosophical topics, detailed arguments for whether the income 
tax should be flat or graduated, or whether economic growth should occur from the top 
down via tax breaks or from the bottom up via direct social funding, maintain public 
interest. A subject such as the death penalty rarely keeps a conversation neutral and 
uncharged, and the details of arguments underlying various positions in this debate serve 
to increase, not decrease, the intensity of interest and, perhaps, tension. Even among 
people holding identical beliefs on the subject, a discussion of agreement about the death 
penalty, including detailed arguments for either side, will raise hackles.
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The emphasis we place on morality is reflected in the weight we attach to 
decisions we would consider moral. We all recognize the difference between situations 
and decisions we think contain moral content and those we think do not, and while most 
people may struggle if asked to articulate the difference, this difficulty is one of 
articulation and does not reflect their inability to note that a difference exists. I want to 
be careful not to enforce a dichotomy that separates moral from non-moral, holding 
instead that the distinction reflects endpoints on a continuum that, as Socrates’ question 
suggests, recognizes the applicability of value judgments across the whole of our lives. 
For here, however, the language of dichotomy is useful for demonstrating a recognition 
of moral content in our lives. Thus, while the trained scholar may have a greater 
awareness of presuppositions containing moral content that underlie decisions that may 
not be obviously fraught with moral content, it is the case that people distinguish between 
decisions they consider moral and those they think are not, and they are able to recognize 
morality in their lives. Again, whether the validity of this distinction holds up to 
philosophic scrutiny is a different subject.
A key aspect of the difference between decisions considered to have moral 
content and those that do not is the nature of the reasons we give for the decisions. If we 
bought a new car and someone asked why we chose a certain car color over another, we 
would shrug our shoulders and respond that we simply like it. Perhaps it has been a 
favorite color since childhood, or maybe it is the color most displayed in all the 
showrooms and magazines. The answer, however, would not draw on principle or deep- 
seated argument.
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If asked why we purchased a certain model over another, however, a wider range 
of answers is possible. Cars can be status symbols, and the choice of one over another 
reflects awareness of this. However, cars are, primarily, functional possessions; we use 
them, and we often use them quite hard. The choice of car model, then, also reflects the 
vehicle’s ability to meet our predetermined needs. Weekend summertime visits to the 
lake house require a vehicle with sufficient capacity o carry the whole family, the kids’ 
friends, everybody’s possessions, and food for the weekend. Perhaps the vehicle also 
needs to pull a boat trailer. In contrast, a daily commute to work and occasional trips to 
the grocery store fit a very different car.
In these examples, we see the introduction of moral content. It would be difficult 
to argue that the person purchasing a car for status reasons does so for moral reasons, 
though moral issues may be involved. In contrast, the person who can afford a status car 
but chooses something of a different character may be acting from the belief that humility 
is a virtue, thus deliberately avoiding the ostentatious status car. If we were to ask these 
two people why they chose the cars they did, we would find that the nature of the answers 
is very different. While it may be the case that the first person’s occupation requires a 
certain facade in order to deal effectively with prestigious clients or donors, in truth, very 
few people can make such a justification for purchasing a status car. Given the generally 
high reliability of new cars today, it is a safe assumption that status cars are purchased for 
status reasons. If we asked the second person why he or she purchased a particular car 
that is not a status car, we might receive an enlightening reason, such as that it was a 
Consumer Digest recommendation. If, however, and perhaps more importantly, we 
asked this person why he or she did not purchase the status car, we will most likely
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receive a principled reason. In other words, unlike the person who purchased the status 
car for status reasons, this second person could, if pressed, offer a defendable, principled 
reason for the choice to purchase a particular car and not the status car.
The point of these examples is to show that a characteristic difference between 
decisions considered to have moral content and those that do not lies in the gravity we 
perceive in the decision. We attribute a certain significance to those decisions considered 
to have moral content, and one way to identify this perceived significance is to note the 
reasons we give for making particular decisions. We do not consider our moral decisions 
to be based on arbitrary reasons. We do not think our motives as insignificant or 
negotiable. Rather, when making a decision we would generally categorize as moral, we 
think of our decision as having arisen from some reasoning, or, if the decision has been 
made with minimal reasoning, we could, if pressed, offer some justification for our 
decision.
While we may cite spontaneity or whim, even arbitrary personal preference, as the 
reason for choosing to act in certain ways and not others, such as whether to buy the 
midnight blue or arctic teal car, we do not think of these light motives as prompts for the 
choices we would customarily describe as having moral content. However, it is 
important to note here that these “lighter” decisions are also laden with moral content. 
That we do not or cannot defend them reflects our inability to recognize the presence of 
morality in these decisions rather than their lack of moral content. Decisions of whim, 
then, are not amoral; they simply reside in a realm of decisions we do not customarily 
think of as moral. We do not attribute gravity or significance to them in the same way we 
do to decisions we understand to contain moral content. In the situation above, then, each
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of the decisions is laden with moral content. However, only the reasons given by the 
person who did not purchase the status car reflect the gravity we associate with our moral 
decisions.
Again, this discussion gives rise to the already-mentioned dichotomy.
Apparently, we sometimes act outside the realm of moral content, and at times our 
actions are laden with moral content. An important side effect of this distinction between 
decisions we consider to have moral content and those we think do not is that it creates an 
artificial boundary in our lives. The fact that most people can distinguish between the 
two decision types, being able to justify and defend certain decisions while remaining 
indifferent about others, gives rise to the notion that our moral life is compartmented and 
separated from normal, daily living. Now I am making a moral decision; now I am not. 
We, of course, do not always think this with each action, but, if pressed, most people 
would make the distinction.
Modern moral philosophy has encouraged such thinking. Keeping with the 
modern era’s attempts at epistemological certainty, its two most influential moral 
thinkers, Kant and Mill, provide comprehensive systems for determining whether actions 
are moral. Kant’s categorical imperative allows one to place an action into a formula like 
a variable, and then calculate whether it is moral or immoral. In doing so, he encourages 
the thinking that separates our lives into moral (moral vs. immoral) and non-moral. 
Although Mill’s system and versions of utilitarianism that have followed allow for 
greater spontaneity when acting, they nonetheless deepen the lines of thought 
distinguishing moral from non-moral action. In either case, they further cement the 
appearance of compartmentalization by making the moment of determination a timeless
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abstraction from daily life. To determine whether an action is moral or immoral requires 
a pause, the completion of a formula, and then a return to normal living.
Socrates’ question, however, does not imply any such distinction. He simply 
asks, How should one live? In doing so, he suggests a different approach, one less 
compartmentalized, where life itself and the moral realm are synonymous. His question 
encourages us to consider life as a whole, where living well is not an option for certain 
times and certain places, but is a mode of living in which we can participate daily. In this 
sense, individual acts can be moral or immoral, but their moral significance is not limited 
to their inclusion in the moral non-moral divide. Rather, acts take their moral 
significance from their place in the organic whole of a life. Socrates’ question prompts 
us to apply the same weight we attach to moral decisions and place it on our daily living.
Regardless of how we understand the place of morality in our lives, whether 
limited to certain realms or manifest comprehensively across our lives, we continue to 
attach greater significance to those actions and decisions we consider to contain moral 
content. Why do we take moral decisions so seriously? What is it about them that 
prompts us to set them apart from other decisions, to give them a special place of weighty 
consideration in our lives?
One aspect of moral decisions that sets them apart from others is that moral 
decisions are decisions we can defend. In situations we might consider to be without 
moral content, our reasons for making the particular decision we did do not have great' 
import to us. We could easily shrug off criticism for the decision because it was one we 
do not think of as having arisen from deeply held convictions. Again, this does not 
relegate the decision to whim; rather it notes a distinction between decisions deliberately
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and conscientiously made from reasons we can, and would, defend from those where a 
request for justification would seem odd. If pressed, we could offer reasons for the 
decision, and we could back those reasons with others. Ultimately, we could defend the 
decision down to some underlying, fundamental principle we hold in our lives.
This understanding of morality as defendable arises in part from the western 
intellectual tradition’s emphasis on rational agency. Presupposed in Socrates’ question, 
How should one live? is the understanding that we have the ability to act in different 
ways and to conscientiously choose between reasons for acting in different ways. 
Presumably, this choice is also a rational one, and, by posing the question, Socrates’ 
suggests that the answer to the question is capable of being better decided, understood, 
and explained through rational examination.
As rational beings, we are not slaves in our daily life to passion, desire, and need. 
Rather, we can will in a way that includes principles and reasons. We can also choose to 
act in accord with, or contrary to, our reasoning. Moral decisions, then, which, as 
defendable, are decisions based on principle although we may not normally articulate the 
underlying principle or principles, coincide with a fundamental aspect of who we are as 
humans. We are rational, and we possess the agency to rationally decide how to act. 
Arguably, this aspect of moral decisions distinguishes them from other decisions we 
make that, although they are conscious decisions of ours and not coerced or mere 
response to stimuli, do not arise from deeper underlying reasons. We base rational 
decisions on defendable, though perhaps slight or superficial, reasons, and, as decisions 
we can and do defend with rational argument, moral decisions manifest a fundamental 
aspect of our humanity.
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Kant offers us a connection, by use of the will, between rationality and morality. 
In Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, he develops this connection by first 
establishing the good will as the only thing that could be called good without 
qualification, contrasting it with all other traits and qualities that are, ultimately, 
corruptible. Gifts of character, such as intelligence, courage, and perseverance, and gifts 
of fortune, such as riches, power, and health, may have many good applications and 
manifestations, yet none of these can be called good in itself. Rather, each can cause 
harm if directed by a will that is not thoroughly good. Unlike these gifts of character and 
fortune, the good will is not good “because of what it effects or accomplishes or because 
of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because of its willing 
(i.e., it is good in itself). . . .  Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish or augment 
this worth.”2
The perfectly good will, however, is rare at best. Our desires and inclinations 
prompt us in directions other than those of a good will, and morality is therefore a burden 
for us. Kant addresses this burdensomeness by naming reason’s “highest practical 
vocation” and “proper function” as producing a will “good in itself and not one good 
merely as a means.”3 Thus, the connection between morality and rationality resides in 
the association of reason and the will, and the will and morality. The good will is the 
proper moral agent; moral actions are those subject to the good will; and it is by reason 
that our actions accord with those of the perfectly good will.
Further, we defend morality because it also engages those aspects of us 
traditionally considered non-rational. We sense its presence in the prodding and tugging 
of our emotions, in decisions we make motivated by love, joy, injustice, or hurt. We, as
10
humans, are stirred deeply in the presence of beauty, in all its forms and mediums and in 
its particular cultural manifestation, even though we may not each appreciate all of these 
varied modes. We hold standards forjudging the qualitative depth of this beauty because 
we want to defend its importance to us. These standards use rational language to explain 
their judgments, but they are ultimately motivated and upheld by the deeper, intangible 
feelings we have in the presence of beauty. Likewise, we may appeal to the language of 
traditional rationality to defend a decision motivated by emotion; however, the decisions 
themselves arise from aspects of us other than this appeal to rationality. That is, many of 
our most profound and potent experiences do not fit neatly into the realm of reason and 
rationality. Yet, few of us would deny the important place of these experiences in 
defining what it means to be human.
In addition to morality’s relation to our rationality and our emotions, we also 
place weight on moral decisions because we tend to understand them to reflect aspects of 
our lives more grave than the seeming minutiae that arise during our individual daily 
living. One reason for this is that morality often includes overlap between our actions 
and the lives of other people, necessarily placing the emphasis somewhere other than on 
us. This expands the focus of our accountability, and thus the gravity of morality. It is 
important to note here that this accountability is not merely an adherence to social 
convention or decorum. We disapprove when people act recklessly in a way that 
threatens harm to others not just because it is socially improper; rather, we do so because 
we understand harming others to be immoral. Thus, when our moral life overlaps with 
the lives of other people, we tangibly recognize that morality represents something 
greater than us. We overtly acknowledge morality’s parameters by willingly limiting our
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actions to conformity with those parameters, tacitly admitting that we are acknowledging 
a greater entity.4
In contrast to the moral gravity experienced in the presence of others, we tend to 
apply a different standard when judging the morality of the action that appears to affect 
our own lives only. When alone, it becomes easy to cut corners or to rationalize our 
behavior. For example, we may allow a blurring of the line between actions that are self- 
serving for principled reasons and those that are self-serving out of merely selfish desire. 
Our tendency to allow ourselves to become morally sloppy when alone in a way that we 
do not when our actions involve other people or are enacted in the presence of other 
people demonstrates our recognition that morality entails a force of accountability. It 
also demonstrates that a theory of morality must explain and expand this accountability to 
apply when we are alone.
Both Aristotle and Kant recognize the need for morality in the context of solo 
action. Aristotle describes the virtues as the standards for the proper moral life, and, 
though most of the virtues have a social application, some of the virtues he discusses 
have application in the absence of other people.5 Temperance, for example, is a virtue 
that applies primarily to actions involving oneself only.6 Kant’s three descriptions of the 
moral law set the moral law in a social context. Yet he is also careful to provide a 
method for determining the morality of actions to oneself. In Foundations, he explains 
the categorical imperative’s application to actions that involve ourselves only, and he 
prescribes proper action by explaining that we have a duty to ourselves.7
However, while we may agree with either or both of these two systems, they 
require some degree of fortitude for their enactment. Unless we exert conscientious self-
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discipline, our sense of accountability in regard to the action is diminished. Both 
Aristotle and Kant give us guides for moral action when we are alone, but these guides 
are ones we grasp with our minds, leaving them susceptible to our minds’ rationalizing of 
other behaviors. That is, because morality presents no heteronymous force in our lives, it 
gives us the possibility to act in a way other than what we understand to be the moral 
action, a possibility that becomes especially accessible when we are alone. The problem 
with each of these systems, then, is that neither appeals to aspects of our lives broader 
than our cognitive faculties, and, when we are alone and apart from the gravity of 
morality realized in the presence of others, morality is subject to our mind’s ability to 
overrule our natural desires.
This reveals the quirk of morality. Morality represents an aspect of our lives that 
we consider greater than our own personal whims, yet it cannot force us to act a certain 
way. We associate it with our deepest understanding of our rationality. We emphasize 
our moral principles, defend the decisions we make from these principles, and take great 
strides to abide by these principles and decisions. We recognize the relation between 
morality and our most deeply felt emotions and experiences. We understand morality to 
represent an aspect of our lives greater than us and willingly subject ourselves to morality 
as we are able. Yet, for all this weight we give to morality and its place in our lives, we 
can choose, as evidenced particularly when we are alone, to ignore morality’s call and act 
in a way other than what we understand to be the moral option.
Further, for all the weight and priority morality has in our lives, it is not only 
unable to force us to act in a certain way, but it can only suggest why this certain way is 
the right one. We cannot point to a topic or argument, as we might in science, and say,
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here, this proves it. We may approximate this verification, but even a solid argument 
remains dependent on a person’s autonomous acceptance of it. Morality is not backed 
with the same argumentative force that a scientific claim may have. Scientific knowledge 
can be proven, secured, verified through fact. More importantly, these means for proof 
and argument are effective in convincing a skeptic. If someone doubts a scientific claim, 
evidence can be given to show these doubts to be unfounded. To deny the evidence and 
argument supporting a scientific claim is to deny one’s rationality.
Morality, however, cannot rest on so secure a foundation. Tests and experiments 
do not provide it with greater validity, and thus force over us, only with greater 
argumentative force to convince us to adhere to its claims. A social survey might reveal 
that an overwhelming majority of people hold the same moral position about a particular 
issue, or that a majority derive greater happiness from certain activities and not others, 
but even this evidence does not equal the force of scientific verification. The tendency 
for many of us to slouch morally when alone is evidence of the difference in force 
between moral and scientific claims. This does not mean that morality’s force is less 
potent than that of science; indeed, many people have moral convictions that are as strong 
as the scientifically verifiable aspects of their lives. Rather, the difference is that people, 
even those who hold very strong positions on particular moral issues, have the option of 
choosing to act or not to act in compliance with those convictions, whereas those same 
people cannot for one second deny the claim gravity has on their lives. In both morality 
and science, people may deny their rationality and act outside of their understanding of 
the supporting arguments, but only the latter can expose this irrationality by demanding 
compliance.
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Bernard Williams deems this difference of force a problem for morality, and we 
can distinguish two modes of this problem. The first, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper, notes that some people may choose to live apart from the orienting framework of a 
moral system. For Williams, the possibility of such a skepticism (to be distinguished 
from one representing a negative morality in opposition to a perceived morality), presents 
a real threat to proponents of the moral debate. At any time, the moral skeptic can simply 
opt out. It is important to note that opting out of morality is merely an assertion; no one 
can live outside of morality, where one’s actions have no moral significance. The second 
mode, which presents a stronger threat of destabilization, notes that moral arguments may 
have no force over those who consider themselves within the realm of morality. Here, 
there are two ways in which this lack of force can be a problem for morality. First, it 
could be the case that the internalized moralities of people who are not skeptics are 
fundamentally incompatible. Religious fundamentalism provides many examples, 
demonstrating that the force one party’s argument has on another is similar to the force of 
a moral argument on the moral skeptic. Second, at any time, those of us who live within 
the parameters of a morality can choose to act otherwise than our own convictions, or 
those with similar convictions, dictate. Thus, although arguments for a moral position, 
whether directed toward the skeptic or toward those, including ourselves, who adhere to 
some conception of a defined morality, can carry significant force, this force is 
suggestive and unlike arguments of science, which can rationally convince or can be 
empirically demonstrated.
Williams discusses these threats as contributing to the search for moral 
Archimedean points. As described earlier, moral decisions are ones we defend, and, at
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some point, this defense must rest on some foundational principle. If we state a position 
on a particular moral issue, we also must be able to give a reason for why we hold that 
position. This reason, however, is also subject to the question Why? and so on. At some 
point, this must end. Thus, we come to an Archimedean point underlying a moral 
position or a set of individual moral positions. For example, if we claim that capital 
punishment is immoral, we will most likely trace this position to an underlying principle 
describing the dignity of the individual life. The discussion of a related position, that 
capital punishment for the mentally retarded is immoral, rests instead on the principle that 
it is unfair to hold all people to the same standard when some are incapable, due to 
insurmountable circumstances, to meet the expectations of that standard. While this 
principle has overlap with that of respect for human dignity, it is not the same. In 
philosophy, we narrow these Archimedean points even further, and Kant grounds human 
dignity, for example, in the ability for self-legislation that arises from reason.
The reliance on Archimedean points in morality is especially poignant because of 
morality’s inability to enforce itself. The history of philosophy’s reliance on 
Archimedean points to support claims about the natural world seldom transferred outside 
the classroom or the salon. We avoid touching fire whether we live in a cave, are 
monistic or dualistic entities, have any faith in the reliability of our senses, or understand 
our last experience with fire as necessarily related to our same unified self. To 
proponents of morality, however, Archimedean points have to protect morality from the 
vulnerability it otherwise faces. Further, as the past 500 years of human history has been 
characterized partly by continued encounters with different worldviews, people’s 
understandings of morality appear ever more vulnerable and threatened.
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This thesis will examine the use of Archimedean points by proponents of two 
different moral theories. Both Immanuel Kant and Martha Nussbaum seek to ground 
their approaches in indubitable foundations. Kant claims we are ultimately rational 
beings, and he grounds morality in reason. Arguments directed toward reason can carry 
force, because we are all rational and therefore should accord with rational arguments. 
Martha Nussbaum, in contrast, seeks to avoid the abstraction of Kant’s metaphysical 
claims, and she grounds morality in the tangible details of lived experience. Arguments 
offered in appeal to our tangible experience in the world, such as appeals to our emotions, 
can also carry force because we are all subject to these same empirical conditions.
The problem of reductionism in each of these approaches is revealed initially in 
their incompatibility with one another. Each, in seeking an indubitable foundation for 
morality, reduces morality to the limitations of that foundation. In grounding our 
morality in reason, Kant denies the tangibles which Nussbaum champions. In grounding 
our morality in the tangible contingencies of lived experience, Nussbaum prevents a 
reliance on the universality and categoricalness provided by reason. Yet, both of these 
foundations are ones we would associate with being human and ones we would consider 
important for morality.
What is needed, then, is an approach to morality that can incorporate each of these 
components. This incorporation does not come without a price. Its inability to be a priori 
and shielded from contingency would displease Kant, and its appeal to a foundation that 
resembles a broader, more general system will displease Nussbaum.
This thesis, then, will consist of the following. After a brief discussion of 
reductionism and its relation to morality, it will present an overview of Kant’s moral
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system and a critique of this system as rational reductionism. It will then summarize 
Nussbaum’s position and critique it as empirical reductionism. The last section will 
sketch what an alternative position might look like, how we can ground it, and how we 
can access it.
2. Reductionism Explained
Successive attempts to secure the certainty of knowledge characterize the history 
of modern philosophy. Following the skepticism of the Renaissance, particularly 
Montaigne’s indictment of knowledge derived from the senses, philosophers have sought 
to guarantee the validity of our knowledge about ourselves, our knowledge itself, and the 
relation of our knowledge of the world around us to the actuality of what this world may 
be.8 Coupled with these attempts are countering explanations that deny the certainty of 
these various attempts to secure knowledge.
Each of these various positions, whether fitting the rationalist or empiricist 
strategy in the history of philosophy, shares a common aspect. In arguing its position, 
each relies on a foundational, seemingly-irrefutable starting point. In other words, both 
the rationalist and empiricist camps are essentially reductionist, attempting to secure 
knowledge about the world, specifically the principles of mathematics and physics, by 
reducing the statements of these sciences to statements of indubitable first positions.
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy provides the most notable example of 
rationalist reductionism. After intentionally doubting all his senses, thereby disregarding 
any knowledge he may have derived from them including the existence of his physical 
body, and after attributing all his thoughts to the machinations of an evil genius who
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controls all his thoughts, Descartes concludes that he can know with a priori certainty that 
he exists. If he is so deceived, then he must, at minimum, exist as an unextended entity 
capable of thinking deceived thought. Cogito ergo sum.9 However, Descartes’ rationalist 
reductionism creates an unavoidable problem of mind-body dualism that he and the other 
rationalists never successfully resolve. Leibniz, likewise, thought he could reduce all the 
statements of a natural science to the statements of logic, thus grounding them within the 
a priori principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.10 He too, did not 
succeed.
Classical empiricists, such as Locke, make implicit claims that the principles of 
science reduce to sense-experience sentences; contemporary empiricists, Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus, for example, make such claims explicitly. Hume provides the most notable 
example of the reductionism of classical empiricism, denying both the rationalists’ claims 
to a priori knowledge of self and god, as well as other empiricists’ claims about non- 
sensory knowledge. He rejects, for example, Locke’s description of our intuitive 
knowledge of our selves, an assumption crucial to Locke’s empiricism. In contrast,
Hume describes an empiricism so severe that it denies even the concept of causality, 
though the events prompting claims of causality, such as the reactive movements of 
striking billiard balls, have been demonstrated numerous times. Rather, for Hume, all our 
knowledge is a posteriori, and he challenges us to try to find some other source for our 
ideas. Thus, even our most complex ideas, such as God or self, are only aggregate things 
comprised of other, more simple ideas. Because Hume states that all our ideas come 
from our impressions and other ideas, it follows that our idea of God as an infinite 
substance comes only from reflecting on our own ideas, and then augmenting them to
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infinity. Writing roughly one hundred years after Descartes, Hume concludes with a 
skepticism more comprehensive than that of Montaigne.
In each case, rationalism or empiricism, the goal of the reduction is to secure the 
epistemology underlying claims of science, which is assumed to be dubitable. What is 
interesting about the concern over the claims of science and knowledge, however, is that, 
at the end of the discussion, we all continue living as though the claims are indubitable.
As Locke notes when rejecting claims that we exist apart from our physical selves, “I 
think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly 
he exists, and that he is something.”11 He Continues by noting wryly that we can discuss 
non-existence or the dubiousness of our senses only until we receive an unpleasant 
sensation. A punch in the nose, for example, quickly reminds us of our existence.
The history of modern philosophy demonstrates that efforts to secure claims about 
epistemology lead toward reductionism. The effort to establish an indubitable 
Archimedean point inevitably defines a concentrated, secure locus. Likewise, moral 
positions, which also seek to establish secure foundations for their claims, tend toward 
reductionism. However, they differ significantly in that an appeal such as Locke’s to real 
life and common sense when defending epistemological certainty does not translate 
completely to a discussion of moral foundations in light of moral skepticism. As 
described earlier, morality has no irrefutable claims on our lives— or at least none so 
pragmatically acceptable—like a punch in the nose does. Although we understand 
morality’s gravity, as evidenced through our compliance with its claims in public, 
through our desire to comply with its principled statements when alone, and by our
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eagerness to defend its principles, we can always opt out at the end of the discussion if 
we so choose. We need not comply.
This susceptibility of morality to skepticism, then, makes reductionism a problem 
for theories of morality. Because moral claims represent and reflect our deeply held 
beliefs, and because they, unlike a punch in the nose, cannot default to a concrete, 
tangible demonstration that we all accept at the end of the day when we finish the 
philosophical argument and return home, reductionism appears even more urgent. The 
perceived need to secure that which holds a place whose importance is tantamount in our 
lives, and yet is ultimately not a mandatory or heteronymous force for us, leads to 
definitive attempts to establish an irrefutable foundation for morality. As Kant states in 
the Foundations, “Morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as 
the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking.”12 If we take morality 
seriously, which we should, then we need to ground moral theories in a secure 
foundation. However, the reductionism inherent to a defined Archimedean point narrows 
conceptions of morality in ways that do not accurately reflect its comprehensive scope in 
our lives.
In philosophy, the dominant moral theories tend toward such reductionism. This 
thesis will address two of them. First, it will examine Kant’s categorical imperative and 
show that this approach, while thorough in its explanation and secure in its foundation, is 
ultimately reductionist and collapses into rationalism in a way that diminishes its ability 
to accurately address our concrete moral lives. In contrast to Kant, this thesis will also 
examine the current work of Martha Nussbaum. She rejects the abstraction of what she 
calls a general theory (such as Kant’s) in favor of a system of moral decision making that
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is appropriate to the lived particular details of our moral lives. Nussbaum initially 
captures the tangible richness, complexity, and comprehensiveness of our moral lives in a 
way that Kant’s abstract, timeless theory does not, but in doing so, her theory collapses 
into a fierce empiricism that resembles Hume’s epistemology.
Before proceeding, we might ask whether reductionism, epistemological or moral, 
is a problem, because the discussion thus far assumes so. Reductionist theories, in 
seeking to establish a claim indubitably, tend toward a narrowness that does not 
accurately reflect the very reality they try to explain, and therefore are insufficient 
positions. Descartes’ secure claim that he exists, for example, leaves him with the 
insurmountable problem of accounting for his physical body. Hume’s strict empiricism, 
like the positivism it foreshadows, leaves us with a discouragingly atomistic and 
mechanistic view of the world. This view does not even allow us to posit complex, 
abstract ideas or values which, as Kant notes, are required for any sense of overarching 
coherence in our lives. The failure of each of these reductionist positions to accurately 
describe our lives is evident in the fact that we all return to daily life when the discussion 
is over. We do not live as dualistic entities, nor do we see continually conjoined events 
as eternally coincidental and therefore arbitrary. Rather, we understand each observation 
or event in our lives as fitting within the broader story of our lives. Our lives, taken as a 
whole, are non-reductionist by nature, and the individual moments that comprise our 
broader lives are equally non-reductionist. We do not at any one time point to an event or 
sensation and name it as the foundation on which the rest of our life depends. Rather, 
these significant moments act as landmarks within the broader scope of a life’s narrative. 
From them, we gain reference and direction, and we may even understand them to define
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the reality of daily life or to demarcate the beginnings and endings of individual eras in 
our lives, but we do not reduce all our other experiences to these singular moments.
There appears to be a trade off, then, between the grounded security we desire in 
our epistemological or moral positions and the ability of these positions to accurately 
reflect the full richness and complexity of our lives. If we imagine a continuum where 
rational security defines one end and empirical security the other, this tradeoff becomes 
easy to pinpoint. As an epistemological or moral theory approaches the end of the 
continuum representing rational security, that is, as it tends toward an a priori and 
universal foundation, its ability to accurately reflect the reality of our tangible lives 
diminishes. Rational reductionism, with its focus on a priori reason, abstracts from the 
concrete contingencies that comprise the real fabric of our everyday lives. Likewise, as 
we move toward empirical certainty grounded in the individual moments of concrete 
experience, we lose the broader necessity and universality that characterize a foundation 
based in reason. Ironically, then, empirical reductionism is also an abstraction from the 
fabric of life. While it emphasizes the role of these tangible details, it struggles to 
connect them, apart from the introduction of presupposed content, into a meaningful 
whole representative of our real lives.
This tradeoff between reductionist securities and richness is not so simple or black 
and white, and it manifests itself differently in epistemology and morality. For now, 
however, we will let it stand. The important point to note here is that reductionist 
theories, in seeking to pinpoint the specific and even absolute foundation for our 
knowledge of the world or morality, fail to accurately represent the reality of our greater 
lives.
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Moral reductionism presents a greater problem than does epistemological 
reductionism and is the focus of this thesis. Debates over epistemology end when the 
discussion is over and the arguers return to life outside philosophical discussion.
Whether we are dualistic entities or not, we eat when we are hungry. We, the subjects of 
our unified or accompanying bodies, feel pain when we are struck, and we feel 
psychological pain when hate accompanies this striking. Whether continually conjoined 
events are actually so because of causality or coincidence, we function with the 
confidence that they are causal. Epistemological skepticism never has us doubting 
whether or not we will fall to the ground if we step off a balcony.
Morality, however, which represents or relates to many of our most deeply held 
beliefs, cannot simply default to daily life when the discussion is over. There are no 
external forces acting on us that morality must account for in the same way that a theory 
of epistemology must account for the apparent demands of an apparent physics. Rather, 
when the debate over moral theories ends, we, autonomously, must still decide how to 
act. Although we cannot live amoral lives apart from moral significance, we can opt into 
a particular system of morality. Further, if we choose, generally, to live within a 
particular moral framework, we must with each action decide whether we are acting in 
accord with what we understand to be morality, and then whether or not we will follow 
through with morality’s demands once we have made the judgment. In morality, there is 
no recourse to just plain living within the parameters of external forces. We live within 
the structure of external civil laws, but this presents different demands than an abstract 
system of morality. This is not to distinguish “moral” acts from those daily actions we
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perform without consciously thinking of them as “moral.” Rather, it notes that morality, 
unlike epistemology, still requires conscientious consideration for its enactment.
We, of course, do not strictly undergo this deliberation process with each action.
Kant’s categorical imperative implies that we do. Mill and successive utilitarians, on the
other hand, recognize that the relationship of our actions to our understanding of morality
resembles that of our actions to our understanding of epistemological certainty. Similar
to the way that we continue living whether or not we know for sure if our experiences
accurately represent reality, utilitarianism generally concludes that we act for our own
good, and that the aggregate of a society of individuals acting for their own good is a net
positive of good. For Mill, morality is not a struggle over each action, and the difference
between his approach and that of Kant is evident both in the moral decision process and
in the consequences of these decisions. Kant’s perhaps unrealistic continual calculation
with each action assures that we do not act in a way that compromises the dignity of
others or ourselves. Mill concludes Utilitarianism with the admission that some people
may be trampled by others within the pragmatic parameters of his theory, but he carefully
allows for this as long as the aggregate good increases. “All persons are deemed to have
a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency [i.e.,
1greater aggregate good] requires the reverse.”
Although utilitarianism accurately notes that we do not continually struggle under 
the burden morality places on each of our decisions, it tends to understate the role and the 
scope of morality in our lives. We do not consider morality lightly. It is not an 
afterthought or postscript we attach to actions we would have committed anyway. This 
retort oversimplifies the utilitarian school, yet it maintains an important distinction.
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Specifically, we act purposefully, conscientiously taking note of our actions in light of 
our understandings of morality.
Socrates’ question, How should one live? then, does not represent mere 
pondering. We attribute to morality the highest place in our lives, submitting both our 
wills and our physical desires to its claims. We also do not perceive morality to be an 
abstracted aspect of our lives distinct from the meaning in our lives. While we may 
consciously understand certain acts to be laden with more moral content than others, we 
do not consider morality to exist in isolated pockets only.
A theory of morality then, must meet these two requirements. It must accurately 
encompass the gravity and security we attribute to morality. It must also reflect the 
richness and complexity of our individual moral decisions as they relate to the 
comprehensive totality of our lives.
A difficulty has arisen, however, with attempts to meet these requirements. As 
described earlier, the reductionism inherent to a defined Archimedean point narrows a 
conception of morality in a way that conflicts with morality’s comprehensiveness in our 
lives. Specifically, the establishment of morality’s rational or empirical security seems to 
contradict the richness and complexity of our lives. Likewise, a moral theory that truly 
addresses this richness and complexity, focusing on the region of the continuum between 
the ends of rationalism and empiricism, appears to spread and therefore thin the locus of a 
moral system such that it weakens the secure foundation it needs to have.
The moral theories of Kant and Nussbaum demonstrate the problems of rational 
and empirical reductionism in morality. In providing a seemingly irrefutable foundation 
for morality that is secured in the a priori, necessary realm of reason, Kant cannot allow
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the contingent, a posteriori details of our lives to provide moral guidance. Yet none of us 
would deny the place of love, sympathy, hurt, or anger in our moral lives. Nussbaum 
correctly seeks to reinvigorate the richness of the ethical life by grounding it in the 
concreteness of experience, including elevating the status of human emotional 
intelligence. Yet, in making the lived crux of a moral decision the basis for her theory, 
she disrupts—functionally deconstructs—the possibility of a greater moral order, and her 
theory resembles a Hume-like empiricism.
The question of interest here is whether or not this security and richness can be 
achieved without the reductionism that has thus far accompanied such attempts. And the 
answer is probably not. The naming of an Archimedean point necessarily narrows a 
moral theory, whether this point be that of abstract rationalism or the tangible 
contingencies of a particular moment. Without such a focus, morality is ungrounded, 
and, as Kant correctly notes, this is unacceptable.
However, the goal of avoiding the reductionism that has accompanied theories 
such as Kant’s or Nussbaum’s is not to extricate a safe moral theory from the foundation 
that provides its security. Reductionism, or perhaps concentration, is not itself 
detrimental to effective moral theory. It is an unavoidable component of any defense of 
morality. The difficulty that Kant and Nussbaum create for their theories is that they 
reduce their theories to loci too narrow to accurately address the richness, complexity, 
and comprehensiveness of morality in our lives. For Kant, this is the security of a priori 
reason. Nussbaum correctly shifts the locus of morality away from the abstraction Kant 
gives it, but in describing a moral decision making process dependent on the lived 
moments of tangible human life, she is left with a mosaic-like collection of individually-
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meaningful decisions. She must presuppose the overarching moral principles that 
provide the comprehensiveness and security to morality.
In contrast, the need is for a re-examination of the nature of the moral life and 
moral decisions. Morality needs a secure foundation. But this foundation does not need 
to be a singular, narrow point or series of points, as it is for Kant and Nussbaum. We do 
not understand our lives as reduced to a singular focus, and morality, which reflects the 
comprehensive meaning we find in our lives, also should not be reduced to a narrowly 
defined moment.
In the postscript to Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, Bernard Williams 
concludes with the hope that morality will be understood on the bases of truth, 
truthfulness, and the meaning of an individual life. By truth, he means the facts of 
science; by truthfulness, the ability to recognize our mistakes and then change our 
interpretations of these facts; and by the meaning of an individual life, a shifting of the 
moral discussion from the abstract argumentation of philosophy to the more tangible 
reality of human life.14 Unfortunately, he does not elaborate much more than this. Yet, 
these three bases do provide a sort of foundation for morality, but with a twist. They 
continue his argument that morality is a different game than traditional philosophy has 
made it, one less fitting for traditional argumentation and proof.
With this in mind, then, we can begin to chart an alternative to the theories 
provided by Kant and Nussbaum. If we can define a foundation for morality that is still 
defendable but avoids the narrow reductionism that has thus far accompanied moral 
theories, then we can still provide the security required for morality while accurately 
reflecting the richness and complexity that characterizes the moral life. The hope here,
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however optimistic, is that this broader reductionism or concentration will describe a 
foundation for morality that, although less secure than more narrow reductionisms, will 
carry greater force.
The remainder of this thesis will be written from this perspective.
3. Kant’s Moral Method
In the history of philosophy, Kant’s standard role is that of reconciler of the 
claims and failures of his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. Claiming that Hume’s 
skepticism woke him from his dogmatic slumber, he establishes a secure foundation for 
knowledge and the natural sciences through the introduction of synthetic a priori 
judgments in the Critique o f Pure Reason. Such judgments contain both the a priori 
security required by the rationalists and the content of experience desired by the 
empiricists.
Although the security of the natural sciences figures prominently in Kant’s critical 
work, he maintains another focus throughout. In the conclusion to the Critique o f  
Practical Reason, Kant writes, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me.”15 An equally pressing goal for Kant, 
then, is to also explain the place of morality in our lives. The Critique o f Pure Reason 
lays the foundation for the security of our knowledge, and it also provides a framework 
for securing morality. As Guyer and Wood state in their introduction to the Critique o f 
Pure Reason, Kant’s metaphysical system must effectively explain not only the sciences, 
but also God, freedom, and immortality, because our morality has an “inescapable stake”
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in the success of this metaphysics.16 In this section, I will explain Kant’s objectives for a 
system of morality, how the introduction of synthetic a priori judgments provides a non­
reductionist security for our knowledge, and then how, by analogy, they appear to 
provide this same non-reductionist security for morality.
Kant’s objective in defining a system of morality is to insulate morality from any 
possibility of contingency. If morality is to give guidance, then it must be objectively 
secure— a priori, necessary, and universal— and Kant emphasizes this point. In the 
preface to the Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, he states, “Morals themselves 
remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm for their 
correct estimation is lacking.”17 Further, a moral law “must imply absolute necessity.”18 
Specifically, “All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the 
application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect 
a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self- 
sufficient theory.”19 He asks rhetorically, “Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a 
pure moral philosophy which is completely freed from everything which may be only
9ftempirical and thus belong to anthropology?” and then answers in the affirmative.
In other words, if morality is to fulfill its role as a guide and supreme norm, then 
it cannot be the case that morality rests on questionable or moveable grounds. Even if we 
accept the security provided by our senses and our experiences, we cannot, as Hume 
argues, piece together a complex idea of morality from these empirical snippets, 
regardless of how complete the picture they give us may appear. A secure system of 
morality cannot be a patchwork of particular responses to particular moral quandaries.
As Kant states, the ground for moral law “must not be sought in the nature of man or in
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the circumstances in which he is placed but a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason,
and that every precept which rests on principles of mere experience...  may be called a
21practical rule but never a moral law.”
Clearly, this necessity is available only a priori in reason. However, Kant has no 
interest in the dogmatism of his rationalist predecessors. Therefore, the metaphysics 
underlying the moral law he seeks to describe must somehow balance the necessity and 
security found only a priori in reason with the equally pressing case against dogmatism. 
To accomplish this, Kant offers the transcendental logic, a peculiar system of a priori 
knowledge possible only in the presence of sensibility. The full details of this system do 
not interest us here, but the form of knowledge Kant’s metaphysics gives us— synthetic a 
priori judgments—provides the framework for his explanation of the moral law. 
Therefore, because the form of synthetic a priori judgments figures so prominently in a 
discussion of Kant’s morality, and later in the critique of his moral system, a brief 
explanation is in order.
In the introduction to the Critique o f Pure Reason, Guyer and Wood describe 
Kant’s goals as seeking to “not only undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics 
but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what 
can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience 
and its extension into natural science.” They continue that he, therefore, “had to find a 
way to limit the pretensions of the dogmatists while defending metaphysics as a science 
which is both possible (as was denied by the skeptics) and necessary (as was denied by 
the indifferentists).”22
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Kant’s strongest criticism of the rationalists was his accusation of dogmatism, the 
assumption that reason could proceed in explaining metaphysics without an “antecedent
'y'Xcritique of its own capacity.” Kant objects that dogmatic statements make knowledge 
claims about metaphysical reality they are not entitled to make, and then he provides this 
needed critique by explaining that all cognition of reason must conform to the objects of 
experience. This requires the thing in itself, which, depending on how we interpret Kant 
on this subject, can place anti-dogmatic parameters on reason. His theory of knowledge, 
then, offers a solution that provides both a priori security and synthetic content. The a 
priori component provides the required security sought by the rationalists (and Kant), and 
possible experience provides the critique—the parameters of content—to limit reason.
The error of the dogmatic reduction of knowledge to reason occurs because rationalism 
ignores the validating, and limiting, parameters offered by experience.
Synthetic a priori cognitions, then, offer us what Gordon Brittan Jr. calls the 
“really possible” world.24 The thing in itself, accessed in experience, provides the 
conditions for the grounding of reason. Although reason can think speculatively beyond 
the bounds of experience without erring, it cannot claim knowledge about any such 
topics. Thus, Kant explains, we can think of the thing in itself as an object, but we cannot 
cognize it as such. This distinction is necessary for valid experience. Otherwise, there 
would exist, as he claims, the absurdity of appearances without an object that appears.25 
It is also required for limiting the claims of reason, grounding its knowledge within the 
parameters of experience.
With this in mind, Brittan argues in Kant’s Theory o f Science that Kant’s 
epistemology is anti-reductionist. He posits an alternative to the standard interpretation
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of Kant’s role in the history of philosophy, where Kant reconciles the claims of his 
rationalist and empiricist predecessors by his introduction of synthetic a priori judgments. 
Brittan’s claim is that each of these positions is essentially reductionist, attempting to 
secure knowledge about the world, specifically the principles of mathematics and 
physics, by reducing the statements of these sciences to statements of indubitable first 
positions. In each case, rationalism or empiricism, the goal of the reduction is to secure 
the epistemology underlying claims of science and about the world, which are otherwise 
subject to foundationless claims, including skepticism.
Brittan’s alternative to this explanation of Kant describes Kant not as the 
dialectical solution to these two schools, merging their positions in synthetic a priori 
judgments. Rather, he describes Kant as rejecting the rationalist and empiricist projects 
altogether. Kant does not build from their foundations, but views their basic attempts to 
secure their positions as misguided. Brittan states, “What Kant wrote constitutes not so 
much a reconciliation of ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ as the rejection of a feature they 
share in common [their reductionism].”26 Brittan continues that Kant’s Copernican 
revolution was not the introduction of synthetic a priori knowledge itself, but his 
addressing of the same goal—the security of epistemological knowledge about the 
world—by first accepting the principles of science as secure, and then explaining their 
metaphysical underpinnings. In the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant shifts the 
epistemological question away from whether knowledge is possible to an explanation of, 
given the security of science, how it is possible. By delineating a system for knowledge, 
one that is complete and consistent on its own terms, he can offer the real possibility of a 
secure science that is nonreductionist. Synthetic a priori knowledge, then, does not
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provide a reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism, but offers a novel, 
nonreductionist epistemology.
Kant’s system of morality relies on this same nonreductionist framework. The 
categorical imperative, the primary expression of the moral law, is a synthetic a priori 
judgment.27 Kant very clearly emphasizes the moral law’s a priori nature, and thus its 
required necessity and universality. The law is also synthetic; it has content and cannot 
be analytically determined from reason alone. As synthetic and a priori, then, the moral 
law appears to avoid a collapse into either position, and it resembles the robustness that 
characterizes the real-possibility, synthetic a priori propositions Kant sought for his 
epistemology.
To describe the law as both synthetic and a priori depends on Kant’s metaphysics, 
specifically the interrelationship of the idea of freedom, autonomy, morality, and the 
natural world. Here, I will quote Kant in full:
Categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of freedom makes 
me a member of an intelligible world. Consequently, if I were a member 
of that world only, all my actions would always be in accordance with the 
autonomy of the will. But since I intuit myself at the same time as a 
member of the world of sense, my actions ought to conform to it, and this 
categorical ‘ought’ presents a synthetic a priori proposition, since besides 
my will affected by my sensuous desires there is added the Idea of exactly 
the same will as pure, practical of itself, and belonging to the intelligible 
world, which according to reason contains the supreme condition of the 
sensuously affected will. It is similar to the manner in which concepts of
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the understanding, which of themselves mean nothing but lawful form in 
general, are added to the intuitions of the sensible world, thus rendering 
possible a priori synthetic propositions on which all knowledge of a 
system of nature rests.28
The moral law is inextricably connected with autonomy, and this autonomy serves 
both to give validity to the moral law and to provide the synthetic content of the law.
“All maxims are rejected which are not consistent with the will’s giving universal law. 
The will is not only subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must be conceived 
also as itself prescribing the law, of which reason can hold itself to be the author; it is on
O f i
this ground alone that the will is regarded as subject to the law.” “Reason, therefore, 
relates every maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every other will and also to 
every action towards itself; it does not do so for the sake of any other practical motive or 
future advantage but rather from the Idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no 
law except one which he himself also gives.”31 Only in this way can a moral law be 
applicable yet universal and categorical, avoiding the hypothetical status of empirical law 
and the coercion of heteronymous forces. Only in this way, by freely willing to act 
according to laws we give ourselves in accord with reason, do we act morally.
The interrelation of autonomy and the moral law relies on the presupposed idea of 
freedom. Together with God and immortality, freedom is a regulative idea presupposed 
by reason. Kant’s proposed regulative ideas serve the purpose of providing a framework 
for understanding the spontaneous and particular logic of the categories, but, like the rest 
of the transcendental noumenal realm, it cannot be explicitly delineated in a provable 
form. Rather, it is an unknowable assumption. Similar to the way we can posit the
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existence of objects-in-themselves apart from our knowing them, we suppose, as ideas, 
the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, although we can never know these.
The categorical imperative, then, fulfills the synthetic a priori character of Kant’s 
anti-reductionism. Presupposed freedom-in-itself is inextricably intertwined with a 
universal, non-contradictory, self-legislated rational component. As a synthetic a priori 
statement derived from Kant’s greater metaphysics, then, the categorical imperative 
offers us the best expression of morality in our daily lives. It resembles the 
nonreductionist robustness of a statement of real possibility, containing both synthetic 
and a priori components and avoiding a collapse into either rationalism or empiricism.
4. Critique of Kant’s Method: Rational Reductionism
The strength of Kant’s nonreductionist epistemology lies in his introduction of 
transcendental logic, which provides a stable foundation for knowledge and science in a 
way that avoids the reductionisms of both his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. 
Kant then uses this same system to give his morality the a priori security it requires while 
grounding it in an anti-dogmatic foundation.
On closer examination, however, we find that the application of transcendental 
logic to morality is not analogous to its role in epistemology. Kant’s discussion of 
synthetic a priori propositions differs when knowledge of the physical world is compared 
with the moral law. In his epistemology, Kant emphasizes the importance of the 
objective thing in itself for restraining reason’s metaphysical speculation. Experience 
guides reason’s knowledge claims. This limiting of reason is the motivating force for, 
and the primary argument in, the Critique o f Pure Reason. Yet, in his morality, Kant
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appeals to a very different aspect of the thing in itself for the synthetic a priori categorical 
imperative, a presupposed freedom of the will proposed by reason.
Although both approaches use synthetic a priori propositions, these propositions 
are of a very different nature. Indeed, this reflects his different intents as well. In his 
epistemology, he wants to ground reason in experience; in morality, he seeks to purge 
any traces of contingency.
In this section, I will critique Kant’s moral system, claiming that his selective use 
of the thing in itself results in a system of rational reductionism that is unable to guide 
real-life moral decisions. This critique will examine several problems with the 
categorical imperative, finding it short on both theoretical and practical levels. First, the 
categorical imperative breaks from the parameters Kant establishes for knowledge in the 
Critique o f Pure Reason, resulting in rational reductionism. Because of this breach, the 
categorical imperative is essentially formalist logic with presupposed moral content, as 
Hegel describes. Second, the formalist nature of the categorical imperative fails to reflect 
the complexity of real moral dilemmas. The simple examples Kant offers to fit this 
formalist framework do not represent the decisions found in moral life, and an 
examination of real moral decisions reveals the categorical imperative to be lacking in its 
ability to give guidance. Quandaries giving rise to multiple maxims or complex maxims 
present very real difficulties for Kant’s system.
The difference between the synthetic a priori nature of Kant’s epistemology and 
his theory of morality resides in the role of the thing in itself in each, and, when 
explaining the categorical imperative as synthetic a priori, Kant attributes to the thing in 
itself a different status than it has in his epistemology. In the Critique o f Pure Reason,
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Kant seeks to limit the metaphysical speculation of reason and provide security for 
science, and, in discussing these, he emphasizes knowledge as knowledge of objects. He 
implies through this emphasis that the thing in itself provides the grounding for physical 
existence and any knowledge of it. In discussing morality, however, he names freedom 
of the will—presupposed by reason as a regulative idea—for the synthetic component of 
the categorical imperative.
Technically, Kant’s selective use of freedom fits within the parameters of the 
synthetic a priori model. It aligns with Brittan’s description of his epistemology’s 
Copernican revolution, in which Kant supposes the truth of the complete system and then 
explains the arrangement of the components underlying the system. If a complete and 
consistent explanation can be given for the components, then there is little reason to 
doubt the theory in its completeness. Thus, in the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant 
provides a complete and consistent explanation of transcendental logic, including the 
place of the regulative ideas (God, freedom, immortality), all the while being very careful 
to keep tabs on reason’s speculative knowledge claims. Within this framework, then, 
Kant gives us the analytically-derived form of the categorical imperative, yet he avoids 
pure rationalism by building into this form the assent of a free, rational being.
On closer examination, however, we cannot accept this particular use of freedom 
to build the synthetic a priori categorical imperative. First, to construct the categorical 
imperative, Kant improperly assumes the liberty of discussing the thing in itself as 
freedom only. Although he gives a proof in the preface to the Critique o f Pure Reason 
for why morality must presuppose freedom, he does not state why the thing in itself is 
nothing but freedom. He does claim that the moral law cannot be heteronymous, and
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thus justifies why the thing in itself s contribution must be freedom. But Kant never 
grounds this claim. Explaining the motive is not an argument.
Second, Kant’s use of freedom is also problematic on its own terms. Underlying 
this problem of the lack of an argument is the more general fact that, in discussing the 
role of freedom, he attempts to delineate the thing in itself. In discussing epistemology in 
the Critique o f Pure Reason, Kant is careful to keep the thing in itself as a negative 
notion. Although it is thinkable, and although reason can posit freedom, God, and the 
immortality of the soul, the thing in itself is unknowable and, therefore, inscrutable in 
these terms. When describing the categorical imperative, however, Kant discusses the 
thing in itself in positive terms, utilizing it to his benefit. His explanation of the moral 
law works because of the uncoercive nature of freedom, yet, in naming freedom, Kant 
takes a liberty with the thing in itself to which he is not entitled. Indeed, his positive 
definition of the thing in itself as freedom dangerously resembles the dogmatism of 
which he so strongly accuses the rationalists, and he commits the very metaphysical 
speculation whose arrogance partly motivates the Critique o f Pure Reason.
Yet, still, it appears we can defend Kant’s use of freedom by referring back to the 
model underlying his epistemology. If the components contributing to synthetic a priori 
propositions hold together in a way that survives logical scrutiny, then we should grant 
Kant the possibility of this use of freedom.33 With this selective use of freedom, the 
categorical imperative works. That is, it fits the logic of the model he gives us for 
synthetic a priori propositions.
This benefit of the doubt, however seamless the argument, does not work with the 
categorical imperative in the same way it works with epistemological knowledge. The
39
thing in itself as freedom cannot provide the same grounding as the thing in itself as 
object can because of the very system for knowledge Kant gives us in the Critique o f 
Pure Reason. He argues that we can think of objects giving rise to appearances. That is, 
we can know the thing in itself as appearance through the categories, allowing us to posit 
it apart from us and give it objective existence.34 As knowable through terms that allow 
for concreteness and tangibility, the thing in itself grounds knowledge of the physical 
world.
However, while thinking of an uncognized object is possible because we have 
appearances of objects, we cannot know or think freedom in this same way. Freedom is 
vague and intangible. It is a property of the self, and cannot be known. As a defined 
concept, it is a regulative idea posited by reason. An abstract concept, then, freedom 
cannot offer the same force of tangibility. We do not have an appearance of freedom 
from which to think of the thing in itself as freedom, and, although Kant developed the 
categorical imperative as the device to yield the equivalent of appearance, this 
equivalency falls short because freedom’s independent existence does not carry the 
grounding force required to keep reason from abstraction. Contributing to the synthetic a 
priori moral law, then, it cannot serve the same function of grounding reason’s 
speculation as an object does when contributing to knowledge. In contrast, freedom itself 
seems in need of grounding. I will develop this critique further in this section. For now, 
however, the net result of the apparent synthetic a priori categorical imperative is a 
reason-based grounding of reason.
Kant’s choice to limit the thing in itself by selectively discussing it as freedom 
appears to be an obvious blunder. Surely, the tediously thorough Kant, whose texts
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comprehensively explain his philosophic systems, did not overlook the above difficulties 
when writing. He must have foreseen this line of critique, re-examined his theory, and 
then proceeded with his writing, having understood it to pass the test. Indeed, his 
selective use of freedom has a deliberate purpose that fits well into his broader schematic.
As described in the previous section, Kant desired to remove any traces of 
contingency from morality. To guide, morality must have nonempirical foundations.
One of his statements warrants repeating. “All is lost when empirical and therefore 
contingent conditions of the application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and 
a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed 
to predominate over a self-sufficient theory.”35 Here lies the reason for his selective use 
of freedom.
Humans distinguish themselves from all other things by their faculty of reason. 
“For this reason a rational being must regard itself qua intelligence. . .  as belonging to the 
world of understanding and not to that of the senses.” Thus, a rational being cannot 
subscribe to the laws of nature (heteronomy), but must think of the causality of its will as 
residing in freedom. Specifically, “If we think of ourselves as free, we transport 
ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the autonomy of the will 
together with its consequence, morality; whereas if we think of ourselves as obligated, we 
consider ourselves as belonging both to the world of sense and at the same time to the 
intelligible world.”37
Kant discusses the thing in itself in terms of freedom to avoid any empirical 
influence or any hint of contingency in the moral law. Freedom, by nature, cannot be 
influenced. As a component in the synthetic a priori categorical imperative, then, it
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meets the need for synthetic content in transcendental logic while preserving morality 
against the influence of empirical conditions.
Kant recognized that this particular, selective, and limited use of freedom could 
lessen the force of the argument. How can an abstract, non-tangible concept proposed by 
reason ground the categorical imperative? Therefore, in the Foundations o f the 
Metaphysics o f Morals, fearing that freedom would have no force, Kant seeks to attribute 
causality to freedom; however, he struggles to define this causality. At best, he describes 
how freedom serves as a cause. He begins with an analogy: in the same way that natural 
necessity influences the actions of irrational beings, freedom underlies the actions of 
rational beings. Defining it negatively, he states that the will of rational beings requires a 
presupposed freedom to avoid heteronomy. Reason does not respond to external 
influence. If this were the case, impulse, not reason, would be the source of the will’s 
judgments.39 Defining it positively, he explains that the “concept of a causality entails 
that of laws according to which something (i.e., the effect) must be established through 
something else which we call cause.” Freedom, then, is not lawless, but a “causality of a 
particular kind according to immutable laws. Otherwise a free will would be an 
absurdity.”40 Freedom, then, serves as a sort of default cause; it fills the place preceding 
the action of rational beings that would otherwise be taken by heteronymous sources or 
by randomness.
Kant’s argument here makes sense; it is rationally cohesive. Evidently, he 
believed it to be sufficient for his needs. Yet, as before, defining the thing in itself as 
freedom, even in this positive way, still does not endow it with a grounding force 
equivalent to that of an object. The analogy he draws between the causalities of freedom
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and natural necessity fails for the obvious reason that his analogy compares abstract and 
tangible forces. While reason responds to freedom and not heteronymous forces, thereby 
making freedom the only possible cause for the actions of the will, this does not make it 
analogous to the causality of natural forces. Rather, Kant substitutes a structural 
equivalency for analogy, distinguishing two types of actions (rational and irrational) and 
noting that each is necessarily prompted by some cause, freedom or heteronymous forces, 
respectively. That these two concepts fit the same general model does not support the 
needed analogy, and the causal nature of freedom remains very different from the notion 
of a cause in the real possibility of physics. Even defined positively as a causal force 
according to immutable laws, freedom remains a regulative idea of reason itself—a 
presupposed device to understand the will as autonomous. As such, it does not arise as 
appearance, and we cannot structure it in space and time, anchoring reason in the really 
possible world. The categorical imperative therefore fails to achieve the same grounding 
that synthetic a priori propositions have in Kant’s epistemology.
Thus, by describing the thing in itself as freedom when defining the categorical 
imperative, Kant technically meets the minimum requirements for synthetic a priori 
propositions. Yet, limiting the thing in itself to freedom effectively renders the thing in 
itself impotent for its role in limiting the speculative claims of reason. With this strategy, 
Kant insulates the moral law from its relation to experience, resulting in rational 
reductionism.
These theoretical problems give rise to difficulties in the practical application of 
the categorical imperative. Kant’s careful construction of the categorical imperative 
results in a purely formal rule that fits more in the category of general, rather than
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transcendental, logic. This formal aspect of the categorical imperative results in the need 
for empirical guidance, including preconceived definitions of morality and the choice of 
maxim.
In the essay “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical 
Use,” Kant provides some background for a discussion of the relationship between the 
theory and practice of moral decision making. He defines a theory as “an aggregation of 
rules, even of practical ru les.. .  as long as these rules are thought of as principles 
possessing a certain generality and, consequently, as being abstracted from a multitude of 
conditions that nonetheless necessarily influence their application.”41 Further 
clarification is found in the introduction to the Analytic of Principles, where Kant 
distinguishes between general and transcendental logic. General logic, as empty rules, 
needs guidance for its application. This guidance comes from judgment, the “faculty for 
subsuming under ru les.. . of determining whether something stands under a given rule.”42 
To justify why, or to explain how, something is subsumed under a rule, however, requires 
another rule. The application of this rule requires a rule, and so on into infinite regress. 
Kant then proposes the notion of “mother-wit” as the solution to this dilemma, an 
instinctual ability dictating the proper application of rules 43 And for those without 
mother-wit, there are damning examples.
However, these descriptions of application apply to general, not transcendental 
logic. Synthetic a priori judgment does not need guidance for its application. Kant 
states, “The peculiar thing about transcendental philosophy is this: that in addition to the 
ru le .. .  which is given in the pure concept of the understanding, it can at the same time 
indicate a priori the case to which the rales ought to be applied.”44 The reason
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transcendental logic does not require guidance for is application is that “it deals with 
concepts that are to be related to their objects a priori.”45 As a synthetic a priori 
proposition, then, the categorical imperative belongs to transcendental, not general, logic, 
and this application reveals the problem of Kant’s different uses of the thing in itself for 
his epistemology and morality. While synthetic a priori propositions about the world do 
not need guidance for their application, Kant’s narrowing of the thing in itself to freedom 
subjects it to the conditions for the application of a rule. Without an appearance of 
freedom, there can be no relation of concepts to objects a priori, and this leaves the 
categorical imperative without a priori guidance for its application. It is, in a sense, 
empty.
In the second and third sections of the Foundations, Kant seeks to avoid the 
critique of emptiness, explaining that the combination of freedom and reason provides 
sufficient guidance in the form of the categorical imperative. If we see ourselves as self­
legislators according to our endowment of reason, then the only possible rule is the one 
Kant has given us in the categorical imperative’s first expression. In this, 
universalization and noncontradiction provide the form of the rule to which a free, 
rational being would willingly assent. However, as Hegel describes, this content of form 
is insufficient for its application.46
Avoiding the infinite regress of rules, then, and disregarding mother-wit, the 
categorical imperative still requires guidance. This guidance must be found empirically. 
Here, we see why Hegel’s critique of formalism and abstraction from context is so 
devastating to the application of the categorical imperative.
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Successful application of the categorical imperative has two parts: choice of 
maxim (including its formulation) and universalizing of the maxim. Kant describes the 
quandary as the paradigmatic moral situation underlying the need for moral guidance. In 
response to a particular quandary, an agent proposes a maxim which, when universalized, 
describes whether following through on that maxim is a moral or immoral action. If, 
when universalized, the result yields a contradiction or absurdity, enactment of the 
maxim would be immoral. If, however, universalization of the maxim does not yield a 
contradiction or absurdity, then following through on the proposed maxim is permissible. 
The categorical imperative describes the threshold distinguishing immoral from moral, 
where moral is defined as that which is permissible or blameless. It cannot describe 
variations within the moral nor can it make judgments of better. I will address the issue 
of blamelessness later in this section.
The categorical imperative’s content, the form of rational assent to 
universalization, is secure as a priori. In giving examples, Kant emphasizes the 
effectiveness of universalization as the determiner of morality, and he describes 
quandaries that direct us to a single, correct maxim to demonstrate the use of the 
categorical imperative.47 In his examples, it is clear that reason does provide adequate 
guidance for navigating moral dilemmas. Yet, other situations are not so clear. Consider 
the following example, which resembles those Kant offers.
Before leaving for an extended vacation, a woman packaged and hid her silver in 
her house. Upon returning, she forgot where she hid it, and, although she searched 
everywhere, she could not find it. Believing it to be stolen, she filed a claim with her 
insurance company. A representative questioned her extensively and performed
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background checks, and then awarded her $2,000, the full amount of her claim. Six years 
later, however, the woman bought a new house, and, while scrutinizing every inch of her 
house while packing for the move, she found the silver hidden in the trash compactor. 
Having not used the trash compactor for over ten years, she had literally forgotten that the 
appliance was built into the kitchen counter. It had never crossed her mind to check there 
for the silver. She immediately called her insurance company to find out where to send 
the equivalent sum of money as she received from the claim.
In this situation, when the woman found her silver, she faced a moral quandary. 
The insurance company did not know she had her silver, and they had no way to know 
this. Thus, free from any heteronymous prompting, the woman had to decide what to do. 
Keeping the money would require less effort on her part. However, as a good, but 
unwitting, Kantian, she called to return the silver, believing it to be her duty to adhere to 
a policy of honesty. It seemed correct to her that every person in this or any conceptually 
similar quandary, such as receiving too much change at the cash register or finding a 
significant sum of money on the sidewalk, should at least attempt to return the money to 
its rightful owner.
Application of the categorical imperative reveals her decision to be moral in 
Kant’s terms, and to stop the story here would resemble Kant’s examples. However, 
when the woman called her insurance company, it did not want the money. The surprised 
representative said that paying for claims is a planned part of the insurance business, and 
to go back six years to change the books, correct their taxes, and re-issue their reports for 
only $2,000 would be more effort than it is worth. The company told her to just forget it.
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This second part of the story creates an interesting situation for a strict Kantian.
In any subsequent, similar quandary, the woman’s maxim (or the maxim of any person 
who has heard this story) must take into account knowledge of the insurance company’s 
refusal to accept the return of small claims. Although knowledge of this story is a
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contingent detail, it cannot be ignored. Universalizing the qualified maxim, however, 
would require all people to attempt actions they know to be futile. This qualification 
helps illuminate the difficulties that can arise with application of the categorical 
imperative in situations other than those Kant gives us and upon a deeper examination of 
the ones he provides.
In providing examples to model the categorical imperative, Kant does not 
consider the full range of possible quandaries, but carefully crafts quandaries into forms 
that achieve the results he seeks. In Foundations, he provides several examples, 
presenting both the quandaries and the maxims in broad, general terms. When the 
maxims are universalized, the formula successfully resolves the quandaries, neatly 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the categorical imperative.49 In “That May be True in 
Theory,” he offers an example in much more detail, including the contingent 
circumstances of the situation and the emotional sentiments of the trustee. The quandary 
is a much more realistic picture of our actual decisions, and the maxims Kant considers 
again present an adherence to duty, and not to a form of happiness, as the correct choice. 
Here too, however, even with a more richly painted situation, his examples and 
approaches to resolving them seem somewhat disingenuous, and we are left with 
questions about his method’s effectiveness.
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As mentioned earlier, implementation of the categorical imperative involves two 
distinct actions, the choice or formulation of the maxim and its subsequent 
universalization. Kant focuses on universalization to emphasize the non-empirical status 
of the moral law. However, the first of these actions concerns us here, and a careful 
consideration of the details of a quandary reveals where Kant’s approach falls short of 
providing guidance in our tangible lives. Specifically, we can identify two problems with 
Kant’s examples of quandaries and formulation of maxims, his reliance on preconceived 
moral norms and his failure to distinguish between quandaries that are tests and those that 
are existential crises. Both problems arise from his attempt to secure the moral law a 
priori and become evident when examining the full depth of a quandary’s details.
Consider, for example, the second quandary Kant discusses in Foundations, in 
which a man who knows he cannot repay any loan “finds himself forced by need to 
borrow money.” The man then proposes to lie about his intention to repay in order to get 
the loan. When universalized, this maxim is immoral.50 The example is general and 
simple; however, it still reveals the two problems. First, the example, lacking 
complicating factors, gives rise to and then tests a maxim of simple honesty, asking 
whether the man should deliberately lie. In this, Kant relies on the preconceived and 
socially entrenched value of honesty to craft an example and maxim that demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the universalization strategy, concluding that lying is immoral.
Kant does not discuss the man’s need, the amount of money, or why he cannot 
repay the money, and a consideration of the situation’s potential details shows that the 
man may have other options than outright lying, and thus other maxims in addition to the 
one Kant thought was the obvious one. Does the man seeking money need to buy
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medicine for a dying child? Could he appeal to someone’s pity, or to his friends, for 
assistance? Is his inability to repay it due to a physical handicap or illness, or is the 
length of the repayment period too short for his budget to handle it? If it is the latter, why 
could the maxim not be to renegotiate the loan in light of the circumstances, persuading 
the lender to extend the repayment period? Or, if repayment is the problem and if the 
amount of money to be borrowed is small enough, perhaps he could appeal to family 
members with a promise to repay it in service rather than money. A full consideration of 
details, then, is important, for out of them arises the maxim to be universalized, and this 
maxim may not be the single, simple statement embodying preconceived values that Kant 
derives from his examples. Although Kant includes a richer set of details in the example 
he offers in “This May be True in Theory,” here too he designs the situation to lead to a 
single maxim and an outright test of honesty.
The second problem observes that, in addition to the fact that quandaries do not 
always reveal entrenched values in neat maxims, a full consideration of details shows that 
the resolution of quandaries does not always have the form of a test. Kant does not 
distinguish between quandaries that are tests and those that are existential crises. The 
moral agent in each of quandaries above simply asks himself, “Should I proceed with this 
evident action?” and the answer, via universalization of the maxim, is a simple yes or no. 
More often than not, however, quandaries are existential crises, in which the options are 
not so clean and the strategy not so simple. These crises have two forms. In one, a 
choice must be made between multiple maxims, and, in the other, the maxim is complex 
and does not properly fit the universalization strategy. In each case, the categorical 
imperative is unable to provide guidance. I will discuss existential crises and decision
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processes thoroughly in the section on Nussbaum’s method. Here, however, it is 
important to note that an examination of the details in a quandary, which Kant sought to 
purge as factors in the moral decision process, are the essence of these crises.
Even a cursory examination of a moral quandary shows that any quandary may 
have more than one possible maxim as solution. The maxims may be very different, 
leading to different morally permitted outcomes when they are universalized, yet any 
guidance for choosing between them is empirical, based on the contingent particulars of 
the situation and taking place chronologically prior to universalization. Because of this, 
the decisive focus of the categorical imperative is not the act of universalizing a maxim 
as Kant emphasizes, but the choosing of it, an activity that takes place in the contingent 
world in response to particular details. Although, in Kant’s examples, universalizing is 
taken to dominate the statement of the evident maxim, in reality, the particular details of 
a quandary make universalizing subsequent to the choice or formulation of maxims. This 
is exactly what Kant did not want. Yet, in his zeal to purge any trace of contingency 
from morality, he inaccurately overlooked the categorical imperative’s empirical 
composition and failed to recognize the very real possibility of multiple maxims.
In addition to the categorical imperative’s inability to choose between maxims, 
complex maxims, arising from a quandary’s details, provide a greater problem for it. In 
his examples, Kant only proposes simple maxims as appropriate responses to general 
quandaries. However, quandaries are complex, and there is no reason to assume that 
maxims are not likewise complex. For example, faced with a moral quandary, a person 
may propose a maxim that has two components joined with the conjunction and, or with 
the qualifier only if. Thus, to revisit the insurance claim quandary, if the woman involved
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encountered a similar quandary later in life, the categorical imperative would allow her to 
qualify her maxim of honesty—try to return the money only if  the amount exceeds 
$2,000. Otherwise, she would be attempting an action she knows to be futile.51
Complex maxims present a very real problem for the categorical imperative. 
Arising from the particulars of the quandary, there is no limit to the number of details, 
clauses, and qualifiers they may contain. With the proper mix of qualifying phrases, 
maxims could be construed in such a way that otherwise immoral actions become moral. 
In other words, since the standard for morality in Kant’s system is only blamelessness, 
where we understand the difference between moral (i.e., not immoral) and immoral but 
cannot distinguish good and better, complex maxims could serve to talk around the 
problem, effectively lowering the threshold by which a maxim qualifies as blameless. It 
is easy to extrapolate from the above maxim about returning the money only if it exceeds 
a certain quantity to other situations where we tweak qualifying clauses to justify 
questionable actions. Avoiding this would require presupposed moral content, as Hegel 
describes.
The role of the thing in itself is to provide accountability for the functioning of 
reason, and without it reason has no objective grounding. Lacking the requirement of 
experience’s contribution to knowledge, reason makes knowledge claims 
independently—that is, dogmatically—thus abstracting from its validating content. The 
price of this validating, however, is the actual tethering of reason. Synthetic a priori 
judgments do not only prevent reason from abstraction; they literally bind reason’s 
knowledge claims to experience. This grounding does not strip the a priori characteristics 
of necessity and universality from reason, but it does restrict their application. In Kant’s
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epistemology, then, synthetic a priori knowledge is, in a sense, contingent. It has secure 
forms, and it contains necessity and universality, but it is ultimately dependent on 
experience for its validity. That is, reason’s knowledge claims are dependent. In Kant’s 
epistemology, this is not a problem for synthetic a priori propositions, for here, the goal 
of such propositions is critique, a delineation of the proper use and scope of reason. For 
morality, however, this contingency can be avoided only by abstracting moral claims 
from their empirical, anti-dogmatic grounding.
The regulative ideas that guide our knowledge claims, including those of the 
categorical imperative, cannot serve to ground the speculations of reason in the same way 
that objects can, because the regulative ideas cannot be known. Even though freedom 
allows Kant an apparently a priori construction of the moral law, it effectively serves to 
abstract moral decisions from the grounding of the thing in itself, which is crucial to their 
real application. That is, the thing in itself, qua ground of the moral law, detaches itself 
from the thing in itself qua ground of the applicability of the moral law. As such, it 
abstracts morality from the really possible world, resulting in rational reductionism, the 
dogmatic, reason-based regulation of reason’s claims.
5. Transition: Theory and Practice
Martha Nussbaum disagrees with Kant’s assertion that reason and its formulations 
of moral action, such as the categorical imperative, provide adequate guidance for moral 
decisions. In Love’s Knowledge, she describes quandaries as rich situations that cannot 
be subsumed under Kant’s reductionist expression of the moral law. Nussbaum 
emphasizes that moral decisions are complex endeavors that cannot be guided
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sufficiently by general, all-inclusive rules, such as the categorical imperative, because 
quandaries are not general. Rather, making informed, correct moral decisions requires 
paying attention to the particulars of the situation, and acting appropriately consists of a 
response reflective of these particulars. Blunt application of a rule, though the rule may 
be internally coherent and rationally consistent, does not suffice for moral guidance. This 
is a broad topic, and I will further address Nussbaum’s position in the next section. 
Essentially, however, Nussbaum argues that the contingencies Kant wants to purge from 
moral decisions provide the very fabric for our moral decisions.
Kant’s moral theory provides us with a system of blamelessness. The person in a 
moral quandary proposes a maxim, asking, “Would it be moral to proceed with this 
action?” and then applies the categorical imperative. Those actions compatible with 
universalization, however, are merely those that are allowable, and they may not 
represent any positive definition of the moral. Rather, they are better characterized by 
being not immoral. Universalization at best distinguishes between moral and immoral 
actions, and, on the moral side, it fails to distinguish between permissible, obligatory, and 
super-erogatory actions. Even for those who might prefer Kant’s method of moral 
decision making, the categorical imperative cannot guide us in judgments of better or 
best. Few of us would agree that normative positions defined negatively carry sufficient 
force, let alone sufficient guidance. Judgments of better or best require a conception of 
the good, content that must be presupposed in Kant’s system. What Kant gives us, then, 
is a comprehensive system for distinguishing between moral and not-moral—a thin 
conception of morality. Such a theory stands in contrast to those described as thick or 
robust, theories that can lay out a prescription for behavior that is good, not merely not-
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immoral. Generally, robust theories seek to more accurately reflect the real life aspects 
of morality, rejecting methods that abstract or detach morality from the vigor found in 
daily life. This may include giving a positive, decision-making role to the emotions, 
focusing on contingencies surrounding moral decisions, or considering the place of 
surprise or chance in morality.
Each of these possibilities conflicts with Kant’s project, where his overarching 
concern was to define an a priori system of morality that insulates morality from any 
possibility of contingency. Kant could not accept a morality that had any empirical 
qualifications in its definition. Earlier, I quoted him as saying, “All is lost when 
empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the application of law are made 
conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect a result made probable by 
past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self-sufficient theory.” He 
continues by explaining that there are no practices not subsumable by theory. Practice is 
the application of theory. What works in theory works in practice. If there is conflict 
between the two, then the theory needs adjustment. If it is found that a theory is 
inadequate for explaining practice, then this is a problem of there being “not enough 
theory.” It is not the case that theory, in general, is unable to explain practice. David 
Harvey explains this in his book The Condition o f Postmodemity, stating, “The 
enlightenment project. . .  took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to 
any question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally 
ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly.”53
Kant’s position assumes the existence of theory prior to action, whether or not we 
manifest and delineate it through writing or action. Our practice does not create new
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theoretical territory; rather, it reveals what already existed and is capable of being 
delineated in theory. Novel circumstances, then, are new to us only. They appear on the 
surface of already established theoretical foundations, although these foundations may 
not yet be delineated.
We can easily imagine the prior existence of theory when discussing physics. The 
physical existence of the world can be explained through the interrelationships of 
physical forces in time and space according to fixed laws, and any concrete circumstance 
or practice can be explained as the manifestation of the theory that explains these 
interrelationships. Underlying our activities in the physical world, including those we 
undertake voluntarily, is a theoretical framework that we can neither transcend nor avoid. 
In our daily lives, we understand our activity in the physical world partly as interactions 
with a conglomeration of real forces. However, these forces do not derive their validity 
from empirical circumstance; rather, they correspond to theory that can explain them 
regardless of whether these forces are manifest.
This conception of theory and practice, however, has interesting results when 
applied to morality. When we drop a rock, it falls toward the earth because of the force 
of attraction between two masses we call gravity. Morality, however, has no such force 
over us. We not only act autonomously within our conception of morality, but we can 
autonomously opt whether to acknowledge a particular morality in the first place. Any 
prior existence of moral theory consists primarily in the terms we use to describe it. 
Whereas, in physics, the theory that is prior to concrete circumstance explains forces 
whose relation to us is one of heteronomy and that exist in our lives whether or not we 
choose to conscientiously acknowledge them, the theory Kant claims is prior to action in
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practical morality exists only in the realm of abstract reason. For Kant, morality has an 
inherent relation to us because of its grounding in reason. However, due to our being 
positioned between desire and Kantian autonomy, this grounding has no compelling force 
unless we side with morality. Physics, on the other hand, will reveal itself and impose its 
underlying theory to us, even violently, whether we choose to accept it or not.
To discuss practical morality as the application of theory, then, does not have the 
same argumentative force as a similar discussion of physics. We may predict action in 
the physical world because we understand its underlying theory, and its heteronomy over 
us tells us which predictions will work and which will fail. To predict action in the moral 
world is always precarious.
In contrast to Kant, Nussbaum relies on Aristotle’s ethics to explain the process of 
moral decision making.54 Standards can exist prior to perception, but these are not the 
rules against which the morality of an action is compared. Rather, they may exist as 
summaries of worthy judgment—guideposts for future decisions that are “valid only to 
the extent to which they correctly describe good concrete judgments, and to be assessed, 
ultimately, against these.”55 Rules, as formulations stated prior to their application, lack 
the subtlety to address the particular details of a complex moral situation, and they lack 
the flexibility to incorporate new circumstances. Kant’s appeal to the rationality of 
humankind is an attempt to appeal to a rule that is constant, and therefore timeless, in the 
face of changing circumstances, however, even this source of constancy proves 
insufficient.56
In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum reveals much of what is wrong with Kant’s 
method, and the primary difference between her method and Kant’s can be found in the
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pivot of the moral decision. For Kant, is a necessary and sufficient theory, secured a 
priori in reason. For Nussbaum, the emphasis is quite different, and one Kant explicitly 
rejected, the particular, contingent details of each individual moral situation.
6. Nussbaum’s Moral Method
In Love’s Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum presents a substantial alternative to 
traditional theories of morality and moral decision making. She presents two major 
critiques of standard philosophic morality. First, she redirects the decision process, 
focusing it on perception of details particular to a moral situation. In this, she elevates 
the place of both contingent circumstances and human emotions, counting each as 
essential to a thorough, invested decision process. Second, Nussbaum argues that there is 
an organic connection between form and content in written texts, a connection 
particularly relevant for morality, and that certain forms are more capable than others of 
expressing certain content. Much of the book, then, is devoted to examples 
demonstrating the greater effectiveness of fiction over analytic philosophic prose in 
communicating moral content. The second critique is not directly relevant to my 
discussion here, but, as integral to Nussbaum’s project as a whole, it requires recognition. 
In this section, then, I will discuss the theses of Nussbaum as she presents them in Love’s 
Knowledge and the lengthy article “In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” My intent, 
as in the section describing Kant’s morality, is not to argue for her, but to give a 
sufficient account of her position for use in further discussion.
Fundamental to Nussbaum’s position is the claim that general formulations of 
moral theory, expressed prior to any situation calling for a moral decision, are insufficient
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for guidance. She does not want to eliminate general moral rules; rather, she disagrees 
with Kant’s under-characterization of humans as intelligent creatures.57 For Nussbaum, 
humans’ rational capacities are not a greater part of their composition than are other 
characteristics, such as emotions. Thus, the particulars of a situation demanding a moral 
decision and our ability to perceive these particulars play an equal, and even greater, role 
in the decision than does a rationally pure rule for action.
Nussbaum recognizes that any decision must arise from some starting point, and 
that no starting point is neutral. Rather, the starting point for a decision method reflects 
that position’s fundamental assumptions about what is important in human morality. It 
contains a preconceived bias, determining where those at the method’s decision point 
should look for guidance. For this reason, Nussbaum rejects general decision strategies 
conceived prior to the strategy’s application, even if this prior formulation withstands 
internal critique. That is, her rejection of a theory such as Kant’s reaches beyond a 
critique of its formalism or its technical coherence as a philosophic system. Rather, 
Nussbaum argues that prior formulations of moral action miss the point completely. She 
specifically addresses utilitarianism, both traditional and contemporary, and Kantianism, 
rejecting the already value-freighted approaches of both. Utilitarianism relies on a pre- 
established conception of equality and the value of maximization, thus requiring some 
degree of commodification for purposes of comparison. Kantianism, as already 
explained, overvalues the role and scope of abstracted reason in moral life.58 Neither of 
these approaches captures the true significance of the decision process in human 
morality. In contrast to prior formulations, she proposes a reorientation of the decision
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process, “an account of ethical inquiry that will capture what we actually do when we ask 
ourselves the most pressing ethical questions.”59
In contrast, Nussbaum claims that acute responsiveness to the contingent 
particulars of a moral quandary is the very essence of moral decision making, and she 
offers an explanation of ethical reasoning that places primary importance on the 
contingent, particular details of each situation calling for an ethical decision. She claims 
that ethical decisions are themselves complex endeavors, arising from the complexities 
and contingencies found in real life, and that they cannot be subsumed by general 
theories of moral reasoning. The particular details of the context of a decision, including 
the emotions of the agent, are the details to which we are susceptive as humans, and, only 
by being deliberately aware of them can we make proper ethical choices.
Here, Nussbaum’s organic connection thesis begins to develop. She observes that 
“an abstract theoretical styles makes, like any other style, a statement about what is 
important and what is not, about what faculties of the reader are important for knowing 
and what are not.”60 If we understand human life and moral judgment in terms of an 
abstract rationality, then a scientific approach makes sense. Here, Wittgenstein’s early 
work in the Tractatus is a prime example. However, if we give credit to other aspects of 
human judgment, then we should seek a moral guide in keeping with these other aspects, 
a narrative of sufficient complexity and depth rather than a thorough bulleted list. 
Nussbaum notes this different thought in Wittgenstein’s later Philosophical 
Investigations'. “What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. 
There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can
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apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules. What is most difficult here is to put this 
indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words.”61
This last sentence illuminates the problem, or richness depending on how one 
views it, of this alternative approach to moral judgments. Wittgenstein accurately 
captures the underlying debate of competing moral theories with his term correct and 
unfalsified indefiniteness. Nussbaum, Wittgenstein, and Williams all recognize that what 
is at stake is the applicability of a scientific approach to reasoning in morality. We want 
the assurance of correctness, yet, as Kant’s approach reveals, this assurance comes at the 
high price of abstraction from the richness of human life. In Love’s Knowledge, then, 
Nussbaum argues that correct and unfalsified indefiniteness is not a complete paradox, 
and the lack of security that accompanies non-scientific judgment does not automatically 
imply irrationality or unsound judgment. Rather, she relies on Aristotle’s work, 
beginning with his discussion of practical wisdom and intelligence. He states, “That 
practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is [therefore] evident. As we stated, it is 
concerned with ultimate particulars, since the actions to be performed are ultimate
6 9particulars. This means that it is at the opposite pole from intelligence.” For Nussbaum 
and her appeal to Aristotle, this correct and unfalsified indefiniteness captures the essence 
of moral judgment and, perhaps more importantly for philosophical discussion, she 
explains that it is an equally rational approach. In doing so, she rejects the necessary 
association of rationality and scientific clarity.
Nussbaum argues that sound moral decisions need not be the product of scientific 
reasoning by making a strong Aristotelian argument for a more robust conception of 
rational judgment. This argument has three primary components. First, it claims that
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goods, or values, are not all commensurable and therefore cannot be subject to simple 
measurement schemes. Second, it places priority on the particularity of singular 
judgments, emphasizing their importance over any universal approaches or formulations. 
Third, this approach recognizes, in contrast to scientific reasoning, the indispensable 
value of the emotions in sound judgment. Together, these components describe a rich 
and complete process for making correct moral decisions that reflects the goals of 
rational thoroughness and attention to details while avoiding abstraction from those 
aspects of our lives we consider morally salient.
Nussbaum’s conception of incommensurability provides the strongest pillar of her 
moral theory. Here, she relies heavily on Aristotle’s rejection of any science of 
measurement relying on quantitative comparison, specifically the idea that a “single 
standard of value can be found and that all rational choice can be recast as a matter of 
maximizing our quantities of that value.” This quantitative measurement comprises 
four underlying claims, which she calls metricity, singleness, consequentialism, and end 
content. Metricity claims that all the alternatives in a situation of choice have some value 
in common and that the rational person will weigh the alternatives based on this value. 
Singleness claims that the same metric can be found in all situations of choice. 
Consequentialism places the emphasis of rational choice in the end product of the 
decision, stating that choices and resultant actions have value as means to this end, but 
not in themselves. Finally, end content defines the product to be achieved. Thanks to 
Mill, pleasure is the end content that usually comes to mind first, though he was not the 
first to propose, or reject, this.
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Nussbaum rejects this science of measurement for the reason that moral 
judgments cannot be reduced to these four components, and she turns instead to 
Aristotle’s description of decisions between qualitative values.64 Here, she argues that all 
goods are not commensurable. This incommensurability has two components, which we 
can summarize as individual value and necessary loss. Together, these components keep 
the focus of the decision process on the particulars of the current situation and provide 
strong argument against all four components of the science of measurement.
Individual value recognizes that, when we choose between worthy alternatives, 
we choose based on unique values in each, not by seeing each as representative of a 
common value. As Nussbaum concludes from Aristotle’s discussion of the excellences, 
we pursue each of these unique values for its own sake. Here, context is important, and 
we should note that we are not discussing choices for the purpose of achieving some end. 
Thus, for example, if our end need was to move a heavy piano, the unique value of a 
pianist’s musical skill would make little contribution. Rather, to achieve this end, we 
would compare his level of strength to that of another person who also possesses a unique 
set of skills. On the other hand, Hamlet’s choice between becoming his father’s avenger 
and not committing murder presents two very different and incommensurable options in a 
context very different from the former one of achieving some end. In this case, 
consisting of the choice between items, the reasons for choosing one option are quite 
distinct from the reasons for not choosing the other. When considering individual value, 
then, the “choice among alternatives will involve weighing these distinct natures as 
distinct items, and choosing the one that gets chosen for the sake of what it itself is.”65 
This is quite distinct from the moral test of the categorical imperative.
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There is a further, and very important, aspect of the incommensurability of 
individual values that needs mention. Aristotle discusses this in terms of the excellences, 
and Nussbaum broadens it to encompass choice between individual qualitative values. 
Namely, the choice between some items is not a choice where the remaining item is 
dispensable. Rather, it is often the case that each is an irreplaceable component of the 
good life as a composite whole, and a life that lacked either of them “would be deficient 
or seriously incomplete, in a way that could not be atoned for by the presence of other 
items, in however great a supply.”66
An obvious objection comes to mind here. How, one might ask, can a decision 
between two items be made and defended when there is no common basis for 
comparison? (This objection becomes even more potent when a choice must be made 
between multiple items.) Here, again, Nussbaum redirects the question, reframing it 
outside of metrical thinking. Whereas this objection presupposes a dichotomy between 
quantitative, and therefore measurable, comparison and mere arbitrariness, asking how a 
decision strategy can be rational without some common metric of comparison, she asks 
why, when a common standard flattens the richness of the real world, stripping each 
component of its distinctive contribution, we would consider deliberation in a way that 
eliminates this fullness. To ignore the full complexity and depth of incommensurable 
values is equally irrational. She says, “The really rational way to choose, says Aristotle 
with great plausibility, is to reflect on and acknowledge the special contribution of each 
item, and to make the understanding of that heterogeneity a central part of the subject 
matter of deliberation.”
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Understanding many moral decisions as choices between unique and 
nonsubstitutable incommensurable goods means that, when a moral quandary presents us 
with a choice between two options, the choice of one alternative or good means that we 
have not chosen another. There is unavoidable loss in a decision between 
incommensurable goods. Unlike a decision based on calculated metricity, or one made to 
acquire a desired end, where the deliberation process for the decision ends with the actual 
decision, rational choice between incommensurable goods recognizes the loss of the good 
not chosen. Here, the temporal nature of a focus on particulars enters the equation. 
Whereas the categorical imperative functions in a timeless, abstracted moment where an 
agent simply re-enters life and moves on after the decision, ethical decisions between 
incommensurable options are not so simple. A decision is not a singular action; it does 
not take place in a vacuum, and a rational decision between incommensurable goods for 
qualitative reasons does not ignore the recognized loss that must accompany the decision. 
The decision is not like a threshold to cross, where deliberation takes place prior to the 
threshold (or in an abstracted moment prior to the threshold), and where life simply 
continues after the decision. Recognizing the unique contribution of individual options 
necessitates a consideration of the greater temporal situation, which includes the sense of 
loss that accompanies the unchosen, and thus unavailable, alternative after the decision.
How, then, do we choose? If we reject metricity, singleness, consequentialism, 
and end content, and if rationality requires us to recognize the full value of each 
incommensurable option, including the known and unavoidable loss of the other 
alternatives, then what criteria do we use? Nussbaum answers this with Aristotle’s
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second reason for rejecting the science of measurement: the priority of particulars over 
broad principles in practical guidance.
Priority of the particulars rejects the position that “rational choice can be captured 
in a system of general rules or principles which can then simply be applied to each new 
case.” It thus rejects, for example, the catch-all nature of Kant’s categorical imperative. 
Rather, practical wisdom requires the skill of perception for making “concrete situational 
judgments.”68 Perception is requisite for responding to novel circumstances and 
recognizing the loss that accompanies decisions between incommensurable goods. 
Perception also allows for flexibility in moral judgment. Aristotle compares practical 
judgment to the practices of medicine and navigation. In each, it is easy see the 
important role of prior formulations and strategies. These are indispensable guideposts. 
At the same time, it is easy to see that the practical wisdom needed to approach novel 
circumstances cannot arise from a set, immovable formulation.
This required flexibility stands in contrast to the connection between support for 
general, encompassing rules and commensurability. Nussbaum shows that both general 
rules and commensurable standards are approaches to moral navigation seen as 
“progressive stratagems that we can use to extricate ourselves from the ethical 
vulnerability that arises from the perception of qualitative heterogeneity.”69 This 
statement has two important components, a perception of progression and the perceived 
insecurity of morality, and critique of each is crucial to Nussbaum’s position. The 
concern over insecurity reminds us of the David Harvey quotation cited earlier: “The 
enlightenment project took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any 
question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered
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if we could only picture and represent it right.” This control, order, and security was 
Kant’s approach, and, if, after critiquing his system, we sought to replace his decision 
strategy with a better one, we would not succeed according to Nussbaum. We would 
only be making another futile attempt within the same framework of thinking. Thus, her 
critique also questions the first part, where a conception of progression is associated with 
security. The problem with strategies that seek security through prior formulation and 
commensurability is that they face in the wrong direction, asking the wrong initial 
questions. The first step, then, is to reorient our thinking about practical judgment away 
from the idea that the better system is the one that conflates the qualitative heterogeneity 
of our lives.
Instead, an emphasis on perception recognizes that a strict ought cannot 
accurately guide all moral situations. Note the contrast between this observation and 
Kant’s “So act. . . ” Nussbaum offers three reasons for this flexibility. First, practical 
matters are not fixed and predictable. The circumstances that prompted a general rule, 
even those surrounding an appeal to the fixed entity reason, limit the rule to that which 
has already been experienced. A refocusing on concrete particulars reveals that practical 
life may contain surprise. Improvisation, and not fixed rales, may be required. Second, 
practical judgment requires flexibility to adjust to the circumstances before it. This is 
different from improvisation, where novel circumstances appear at a later place along a 
timeline. Flexibility, like improvisation, acknowledges that future, unpredicted 
circumstances may arise; it differs by acknowledging also that each situation is too 
complex for general rales. Flexibility, then, addresses the depth of each situation. Third, 
the priority of perception over general rales recognizes the unique character of each
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situation. Concrete, moral situations may contain “ultimately particular and non-
7flrepeatable elements,” which prevent the universalization of any particular decision.
Even though some situations may resemble others, it is not appropriate to bluntly, or even 
carefully, re-apply decisions. Universalization of a previous judgment is limited by the 
contingent details of each additional situation.
For Nussbaum, prioritizing particulars over general rules offers substantial 
guidance for navigating complex moral situations. Through careful perception, an agent 
recognizes that changing circumstances, the complexity of real life situations, and the 
unique and non-repeatable aspects of some situations require an approach to moral 
judgment characterized by practical wisdom and not the application of general rules.
This practical wisdom perceives the complex particulars of each situation and acts with 
the appropriate level of spontaneity, flexibility, and recognition of uniqueness. However, 
even this approach may still resemble the emphasis on rationality promoted by other 
theories. A complex utilitarian calculus, for example, is not incompatible with perception 
of particulars. Indeed, full perception of particulars, especially those that may arise as a 
result of the judgment (thus acknowledging that decisions between incommensurable 
goods do not end with the decision), prompt utilitarians to seek simpler applications. 
Therefore, Nussbaum emphasizes Aristotle’s third reason for rejecting the science of 
measurement, the role of the emotions in moral judgment.71
Here, the objection of irrationality is strongest. The history of philosophy 
consists, in part, of a continuous endeavor to purge those aspects of ourselves that may 
interfere with knowledge and acute perception of the truth. Plato argues that truth is most 
accessible in the absence of bodily distractions, and his forms represent the goals of an
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uncluttered grasping, by the intellect, of that which we only know imperfectly. The 
Stoics likewise avoided a role of the emotions. Montaigne’s skepticism specifically notes 
that love can seriously misrepresent our lover’s physical beauty to us. For Kant, the 
passions are ultimately selfish, directing us toward action other than that pursued by the 
perfectly good will. More recently, positivism most poignantly sought to excise 
intangibles, such as the emotions, from our grasping of truth. In each of these cases, 
then, the emotions are viewed as obstacles clouding our rational perception of truth.
In contrast to this tradition, Nussbaum proposes Aristotle’s twofold role of the 
emotions. First, rather than cloud our vision, the emotions add an additional perceptive 
ability, helping us grasp the complexities and subtleties in a situation that might 
otherwise be overlooked, or intentionally ignored, by reason. This approach is, again, 
intricately tied to conceptions of commensurability and our understanding of rationality. 
To those opposed to reliance on the emotions, our emotions prevent us from seeing, 
rationally, the essence of the situation. They keep us from grasping the metricity of its 
core. To Nussbaum, in contrast, the emotions flourish in their role in moral judgment 
among incommensurables, and it would be irrational to deny them this place. Some 
values may even be perceived more accurately by the emotions than by reason. Moral 
knowledge “is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply 
intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete 
reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with 
imagination and feeling.”72
The second role of the emotions relates to the perceiver. Moral decisions are not 
cold, calculated decisions, even when a difficult decision must be made. A hard and
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unavoidable decision between incommensurables should be accompanied by some sort of 
struggle or pain in the sensitive agent, and these feelings should not end when the 
decision is made. The emotions, then, are not distractions from true perceptions. They 
are powerful aides that give us both increased depth of insight and appropriate responses 
to our decisions. In emphasizing perception and perception’s emphasis on concrete 
particulars, we must remember that the perceiver plays a role at least as important as that 
of the contingent details. This tangible contingency of the perceiver is in deliberate 
contrast to any system of abstracted decision making.
Nussbaum calls this overall approach “perception as morality.”73 Yet, she 
recognizes that perception emphasizing the priority of particulars and guided by the 
emotions is only a partial explanation of what needs to happen. Accurate perception 
plays an important role in practical wisdom, but it does not comprise the whole of 
practical wisdom. An emphasis on the present-tense aspect of perceiving particulars 
avoids generalization; however, it appears to suggest a clean palate for each new 
decision, which does not help us. Although the categorical imperative overlooks the 
richness and complexity of concrete life, it does, after all, give us a strategy for moral 
judgment. Universal reason, not practical wisdom, serves as the basis for the categorical 
imperative. It is available to every person, and it does not require training or experience 
for its application. For this reason, we praise Kant for developing a moral system that 
begins with an argument for metaphysical equality and recognizes the dignity inherent to 
each person. In contrast, practical wisdom is not available to all from the outset, and 
Aristotle describes it as developing over a lifespan.
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This development, then, unless we assume it to be arbitrary or haphazard, implies 
a process. Although perception focuses on the particulars of a situation, it would be 
uncharacteristic of a perceptive observer to be locked in the present tense and to make 
decisions with a narrow range of focus. Rather, we expect her to make connections to 
other perceptive judgments and to recognize themes among them. We expect her, if she 
remains perceptive, to accumulate such experiences over time, to compare new situations 
to prior ones, and to compare the experiences of others against her own. In short, the 
continually perceptive person has no choice but to grow in practical wisdom. Here, 
Nussbaum suggests a system of dialectic she calls perceptive equilibrium, an approach to 
continued moral judgment that comes out of Aristotelian thought.
Aristotle gives us the inclusive dialectic method, and Nussbaum favors this 
starting point because its mode provides for “continuity with ‘our actual adventure” ’74 
This method compares alternate positions, “holding them up against one another and also 
against the participants’ beliefs and feelings, their active sense of life.” It is both 
empirical and practical. As empirical, it relies on experience in the real realm of life for 
its evidence; as practical, it seeks a picture of life, a mode for us to function well. “The 
participants look not for a view that is true by correspondence to some extra-human 
reality, but for the best overall fit between a view and what is deepest in human lives.. .  
for coherence and fit in the web of judgment, feeling, perception, and principle, taken as 
a whole.”75
Like the other components of Nussbaum’s perceptive approach to moral 
judgment, all positions within perceptive equilibrium are subject to revision. The 
particulars of any individual situation may challenge any held understanding. “Nothing
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is held unrevisable in this process, except the very basic logical idea that statement 
implies negation, that to assert something is to rule out something else.”76 Further, and 
related to her position on commensurability, perceptive equilibrium is “an equilibrium in 
which concrete perceptions ‘hang beautifully together,’ both with one another and with 
the agent’s general principles; an equilibrium that is always ready to reconstitute itself in
7 7response to the new.”
Perceptive dialectic consists of two competing elements. On the one hand, the 
approach is one of dialectic. Perception and increased wisdom are, to some degree, 
inseparable; this process of continued perception and comparison is the accumulation of 
practical experience. On the other hand, her description of perceptive equilibrium, in 
which individual perceptions “hang beautifully together,” is anti-hegemonic. New 
perceptions can at any time challenge existing wisdom and rules that have arisen from 
accumulated concrete, perceptive experiences, and these challenges may dictate a 
rewriting of experience, or they may co-exist in a state of tension. This mosaic-like 
coexistence maintains the richness and complexity of a morality that recognizes 
incommensurables.
There is a further layer of incommensurability, however, that even perceptive 
equilibrium cannot address. Nussbaum suggests that a sustained equilibrium, even one of 
tension where elements hang beautifully together, may not be possible, resulting in an 
end condition that is not really an end. She calls it perceptive oscillation. Perceptive 
oscillation recognizes that even a method of acute perception may still be too much 
method, resembling too closely the timelessness of the categorical imperative. Her point 
here is that the reflection that necessarily accompanies the comparison inherent to
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dialectical perception is itself a moment distinct from the actual living of life, that to be 
immersed in the potential depths of experience does not allow us to perceive the needs of 
those around us, to be finely aware in a way that promotes perceptive reflection and 
equilibrium. To recognize this “complicates still further our idea of what might be the
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practical goal of ethical inquiry.” Specifically,
[the] recognition that there is a view of the world from passion’s point of 
view, and that this view is closed to the perceiver, shows us that 
perception is, even by its own lights, incomplete. The perceiver as 
perceiver cannot see it all; to get the whole he must at times stop being the 
sort of person who cares for wholeness.. . .  For so long as our eyes are 
open, we are wonderful and lovable and finely responsive; but when we 
immerse ourselves in the most powerful responses, entering silence, 
closing our eyes, are we then capable at all of asking questions about our 
friends, of thinking of the good of the community?. . .  Without this depth 
life seems incomplete and perception itself seems blind; but it cannot itself 
be ordered inside the equilibrium of perception or seen by its fine-tuned
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vision of the complete life.
To acknowledge this oscillation is to reconsider the question “How should one 
live?” Thus far, we have proceeded with Nussbaum’s holistic, comprehensive approach 
to moral judgment with the assumption that this question and her method, by eradicating 
the artificial distinctions between moral and non-moral and refocusing moral inquiry on 
the concrete particulars of each real-life situation we face as emotional beings, presents
73
the condition we should aspire to as moral beings. Here, however, Nussbaum 
distinguishes moral judgment that considers the emotions from our sometimes-state of 
immersion in the emotions themselves, a state that is not commensurable with that of the 
perceptive judge.
Without this emotional immersion, we are, perhaps, still too rational fo r. 
Nussbaum. If we are to respond to situations perceptively and in keeping with our 
emotional knowledge, then this condition is food for our practical wisdom. She observes, 
“If there is for us any prospect held out for a life that combines fine perception with the 
silence and the hidden vision of love, it would only be in a condition that is not itself 
‘equilibrium’ at all, but an unsteady oscillation between blindness and openness,
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exclusivity and general concern, fine reading of life and the immersion of love.”
This oscillation asks us not only to reconsider the question “How should one 
live?” Rather, it also acknowledges the “limits of that ethical question itself. It gestures 
toward the limits of ethical consciousness, making us aware of the deep elements in our 
ethical life that in their violence or intensity lead us outside of the ethical attitude
Q  1
altogether, outside of the quest for balanced vision and perfect rightness.” Here, then, is 
the final blurring, the end condition of our ethical inquiry in which perception and 
immersion oscillate, distinct and yet unified, in a way that makes all we know the ethical 
life or, simply, the human life.
7. Critique of Nussbaum’s Method: Empirical Reductionism
In this section, I will critique Martha Nussbaum’s foundation for moral judgment. 
This will be unlike my Kant critique, where I reject his fundamental emphasis as
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misplaced, though finding parts worth exploring.82 Specifically, the accessibility of 
reason, and thus dignity, to all, especially as expressed via the moral law’s discussion of 
means and ends, provides a remarkable account of moral equality. In a somewhat 
different fashion, I sympathize with Nussbaum’s project as a whole and agree 
enthusiastically that her refocusing of the moral discussion is correctly placed. Concrete, 
tangible life, including the emotions, must be a foundation for moral clarity. Further, 
although it is not a point I wish to develop here, literary narrative may be the necessary 
technique for shifting philosophic approaches to morality from the abstract to the 
concrete, and Nussbaum’s pioneering work here is indispensable to this position.
I will limit my disagreement with Nussbaum to one aspect of her project. There 
are practical difficulties with her approach, such as the overwhelming task of integration 
that inevitably results from a full consideration of particulars— a critique we can 
recognize without falling back into a system of metricity and singleness. Full perception 
of the detail temporality and the resultant, nearly-infinite range of potential effects our 
decisions may have on others over time can paralyze the decision process.
Where I disagree with Nussbaum is in her lack of a substantially-grounded 
normative position. This statement requires further clarification, especially since 
Nussbaum’s rejection of abstract morality seems to offer us exactly the substance 
otherwise lacking, and I will develop this claim in this section. For now, however, I hold 
that Nussbaum’s approach is fundamentally descriptive and, as such, fails to be
o-a
sufficiently normative. From within a position of morality, she offers us a thorough 
discussion of the process of moral judgment, including which steps should be taken to 
better this process. She calls her position “perception as morality,” and while
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maintaining the position that a process that is not abstract is better than an abstract one 
because it accords better with the actual fabric of our moral lives, she does not offer a 
sufficient account of the what of this fabric.84 A thorough discussion of how our moral 
lives actually work and which approach is therefore most fitting still does not offer us
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guidance for determining moral direction unless we presuppose norms of some sort. In 
short, what Nussbaum gives us is a thorough description of the concreteness of our moral 
lives and a corresponding argument for why her approach is most appropriate to it, all 
without taking a substantial position as to its content. We are left, then, with a 
description of a thick moral decision process whose locus is the details of individual, 
particular situations that does not provide the foundation to connect these instances into a 
normative whole. Here, we are reminded of Hume, and I therefore call her moral 
position empirical reductionism.
This critique will have two parts. First, it will present her position as 
fundamentally descriptive, and therefore Humean in its lack of necessary coherence. 
Second, it will examine why such an approach is problematic for morality. Again, it is 
important to clarify that I agree with much of Nussbaum’s overall account of the process 
of making moral judgments, as well as her shifting of the moral crux from prior theory to 
tangible experience, and I argue rather that she shifts the locus of moral guidance too far 
into subjective, lived human experience, thereby failing to ground it in a way that 
provides broader continuity between individual situations involving moral content.
Before presenting my critique of Nussbaum’s position in Love’s Knowledge, 
however, it is necessary here to address an essay published two years after Love’s 
Knowledge, in which she offers what she considers to be a thorough account of a
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substantive foundation for normative content.86 Her argument in the essay is interesting; 
she defends a position of human essentialism while rejecting any claims of metaphysical 
realism. Here, definitions are important. Nussbaum begins by distinguishing 
metaphysical-realist essentialism from what she calls internalist essentialism. 
“Metaphysical realism claims that there is some determinate way that the world is apart 
from the interpretive workings of the cognitive faculties of living beings. A description 
of the world is true just in case it corresponds to that independently existing structure, 
false insofar as it does not so correspond.”87 Nussbaum rejects metaphysical realism as a 
foundation for human interaction with the world and for normative content, claiming that 
it wilts under even mild skepticism, for it requires access, preferably apart from human 
mediation, to the truth of this independent, external structure. Therefore, in contrast to 
such a metaphysics and in keeping with her focus on the human realm, Nussbaum claims 
that a form of essentialism is still possible, where the “deepest examination of human 
history and human cognition from  within still reveals a more or less determinate account
oo
of the human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties.” She 
then proceeds with an account of this essentialism, arguing for a politics that guarantees, 
at minimum, the fulfillment of human essential needs and qualities.
Nussbaum clearly describes the origin of her essentialist claims, recognizing from 
the outset that she considers a human account of human needs and understanding to be 
the only legitimate form for such an account. She states that her position is “emphatically
Q Q
not metaphysical.” In rejecting a metaphysical realism, however, Nussbaum is careful 
to avoid any relativist shift into the other end of the spectrum. She rejects the assumed, 
general understanding of the Academy, where “the collapse of metaphysical realism is
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taken to entail not only the collapse of essentialism about the human being but also a 
retreat into an extreme relativism, or even subjectivism, about all questions of 
evaluation.”90 In contrast, she argues for the existence of an indubitable human 
essentialism, founded internally and grasped concretely.
She begins by enumerating a list of properties that describes non-negotiable 
humanness.91 I will not duplicate the list, but some examples include the housing of life 
within “bodies of a certain sort,” a finite lifespan and the corresponding recognition of 
earthly mortality, “separateness” (an understanding of the individual human as a distinct 
entity separated in mind and body from others), and a “sense of affiliation and concern 
for other human beings.” Importantly, Nussbaum recognizes the influencing role of 
culture, religion, and metaphysics when detailing this list, and she is careful to distinguish 
her account of essentialism. Thus, when discussing the common feature of life housed 
within a body, she acknowledges and then avoids the potentially varied cultural, 
religious, and metaphysical understandings of this concept in favor of indisputable 
features such as the need for food, drink, and shelter. All such lists encounter difficulties 
with stringent critical theorists, but it is, nonetheless, a list difficult to disagree with.
Nussbaum continues by then enumerating a list of “basic human functional 
capabilities” that arise from the characteristics of essential humanness.92 These 
capabilities represent specific aspects, arising from the first list, of what she calls the 
“thick vague theory of the good.”93 This list contains normative content; it is thick to 
contrast minimalist theories of the good; and it is vague so that it has flexibility to 
accommodate the varied terrain of human life on our planet. The list describes the type 
of life that should be expected given the essentialist description of the first list. Thus, for
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example, the functional capability that arises from the fact of inevitable human mortality 
states, “Being able to live to the end of a complete human life as far as it possible; not 
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.”94
Her argument here is that if we accept the first list, then we will accept the second 
one. Whether we choose to act on the obligations of the second list in a way that makes 
the capabilities accessible to others is our choice, but we cannot deny the natural 
connection between the two—to deny the functional capabilities is to deprive people of 
their essential humanness. Interestingly, to ignore the second list is, by her terms, to fail 
to be human by the conditions set out in the first list. That is, by not recognizing the 
basic human rights of the second list, we fall short of the characteristic to “recognize and 
feel some sense of affiliation and concern for other human beings,” thereby failing, by 
our actions, to qualify for the essentialism in the first list. Assumed qualification for the 
first list, in turn, binds us to the second list. Further, consistently with her discussion of 
commensurability in Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum states, “The Aristotelian essentialist 
claims that a life that lacks any one of these, no matter what else it has, will be lacking in 
humanness.”95 I will address the implications of these claims for morality at the end of 
this section. For now, my focus is on the relationship of Nussbaum’s essentialist claims 
to her description of moral judgments in Love’s Knowledge and to my critique of them.
Nussbaum’s description of essentialism is important to my critique of her 
discussion of moral judgment in Love’s Knowledge because it appears to provide a basis 
for moral judgment in a way that serves to ground the otherwise disconnected instances 
of moral decisions arising from a focus on particulars. The critique I intend to make 
describes Nussbaum’s emphasis on particulars as the basis for moral judgment as
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ultimately Humean, that is, while empirically rich in each instance, they contain no 
underlying foundation for their overlap apart from what we choose to bring to our 
interpretation of them. In contrast, essentialism offers such a foundation: shared, non- 
negotiable humanness. This essentialism is not a metaphysical position, but, as 
Nussbaum describes it, it provides a base that has been relatively consistent across human 
history and is sufficiently insulated from critical attacks on its position. It stands in sharp 
contrast to cultural relativism, subjectivism, and other such interpretative frameworks. In 
“Aristotelian Essentialism,” it serves as the platform from which Nussbaum argues for a 
normative politics, and in this context it is a strong base.96
This context of politics and international human rights, however, is not the 
context of individual moral decisions, and it would be improper to rely on Nussbaum’s 
account of essentialism to provide the thread of consistency running through all moral 
judgments made from an emotionally-guided, acute perception of particulars. In Love’s 
Knowledge, Nussbaum emphasizes the priority of the particular situation over general 
strategy and, within this, the priority of the particular details unique to a situation. The 
guiding list of functional capabilities, however, is general. Its points advise broad and 
generic principles for action, applicable in all situations. Nussbaum calls these points 
vague, encouraging malleability when interpreting and applying these principles across a 
diverse range of cultures. Yet, there is an unmistakable gap between malleability as 
cultural inclusiveness and malleability as acute response to particulars. The first relates 
to the broader functional capabilities and remains general; the second describes 
Aristotelian perception within unique situations as Nussbaum presents it in Love’s 
Knowledge.
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This distinction is the functional difference between a priori and a posteriori 
theory—the great difference between fitting a prior formulation (whether grounded in 
abstract, metaphysical reason or the essentialism of lived experience) into the context of 
an individual situation and deriving a judgment through careful perception. Nussbaum 
grounds her prior formulation in the empirical world—the lived understanding of human 
essentialness— and not the abstracted realm of reason. She thus provides tangible 
contrast to Kant on the theoretical level. However, the relation of this theory to practice 
brings us back to the two types of theory-practice relations Kant describes. I will quote 
them again: “All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of the 
application of law are made conditions of the law itself, and a practice calculated to effect 
a result made probable by past experience is thus allowed to predominate over a self- 
sufficient theory;”97 and, “Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral 
philosophy which is completely freed from everything which may be only empirical and 
thus belong to anthropology?” 98 Thus, although Nussbaum derives her essentialism from 
an internalist human position and does not seek an a priori foundation like Kant, the 
distinction he makes between the two types of guidance describes the difference of the 
two approaches Nussbaum gives us in “Aristotelian Essentialism” and Love’s 
Knowledge.
In defense of Nussbaum, it is important to note that this essentialism is designed 
for political action. Government-level policies are general; guiding international 
decisions about human rights cannot be too particular. Her thesis in “Aristotelian 
Essentialism” is a deliberate contrast to the academic ennui toward social injustices in the 
name of pluralism and diversity. It provides a baseline for evaluation. Thus, we should
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not criticize the relation of this essentialism to her position about particulars too much. 
The point here is to observe that the essentialism she describes cannot serve as the 
foundation that connects individual moral responses to the particulars of unique 
situations. The two lists in “Aristotelian Essentialism,” then, cannot serve as a rebuttal to 
the critique of disconnectedness in Love’s Knowledge.
Before moving on, there is one additional clarification. It could be argued that 
essential humanness serves as the backdrop against which we perceive particulars in our 
moral lives. The lists of essential characteristics and functional capabilities, then, 
function as parameters demarcating the realm in which correct moral judgment can be 
found, but we still respond to the particulars we perceive in each individual situation we 
encounter. The variety of judgments, however, based on the particulars of individual 
situations, is almost limitless, at best hemmed in by only the most fundamental aspect of 
shared humanity. If we understand the relationship of humanness to particular situations 
in this way, it only seems as though the generality of essentialism can guide us through 
individual moral judgments. Nussbaum’s essentialism, though connecting to morality as 
perception by providing necessary conditions that put restrictions on what is permissible 
moral perception, still leaves us with a gap between these minimal necessary conditions 
and the guidance required for a more nearly sufficient conception of the proper moral 
life.
Further, here also we find ourselves just relying on prior formulations. Although 
Nussbaum’s appeal to essentialism is not Kant’s appeal to reason, it does similarly 
describe a method in which we approach the details of a particular moral situation with a 
preconceived strategy for navigating the details to reach a decision. This backdrop—the
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context of life—is what we reference for determining moral correctness. The difference 
between appealing to Nussbaum’s essentialism or Kant’s reason when seeking a 
foundation for morality is merely the difference between internalist and metaphysical 
realism. As frameworks for understanding morality in theory, they are both helpful in 
their own ways. As strategies for navigating individual moral decisions in practice, they 
are both prior formulations that fall short of fully addressing the unpredictable uniqueness 
of an individual moral decision. Here, the similarity is great. Nussbaum appeals to 
shared humanness known from experience, and Kantians appeals to the dignity inherent 
in each person as a result of being human. We cannot, then, draw on her discussion of 
essentialism when seeking a foundation from which to draw or a backdrop from which to 
navigate when approaching moral judgment as she describes in Love’s Knowledge.
As discussed in the previous section, Nussbaum offers a thorough account for the 
process of moral judgment in Love’s Knowledge. Claiming the incommensurability of 
values, the priority of the particular over the general, and the validated, important role of 
the emotions, she refocuses the moral decision process from the realm of simplified, 
general, and abstract thought to the lived, concrete experience of the given situation.
This refocusing places the locus of our moral lives where we actually live, even in the 
contingent details of a particular situation, acknowledging that, while we may be 
reflective about our decisions during the process, most decisions and actions take place in 
the lived crux of life.
When Kant secured the moral law in a priori reason, he did so to provide it with 
continuity through an immovable foundation, to remove the possibilities of contingency 
and exception. In contrast, Nussbaum makes this very contingency her emphasis, even
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discussing the importance of surprise." Indeed, this is her goal, to retrieve morality from 
generality and abstraction, placing it in the lived tangibility of human life. Kant also 
sought, however, to establish a metaphysical foundation for morality, which he 
understood as necessary for this continuity. Without a common foundation from which 
each instance of the moral life can draw, morality would be secondary to the material at 
hand—it would be, in a sense the dependent result of connecting the dots of individual 
situations calling for moral content. It is again the relation of self-sufficient theory to 
practice, and for morality, which Kant describes as supreme norm and guide, the 
foundation cannot be secondary.
Nussbaum is correct in her realignment of the moral emphasis. We certainly do 
not make moral decisions in abstracted, timeless moments apart from the details of the 
situation, including our emotional responses to the situation. Her realignment also 
revives the idea that values are not commensurable, and to seek a single metric to 
compare them flattens the richness of lived moral experience. In Love’s Knowledge, 
however, Nussbaum’s discussion of the moral life leaves itself open to the critique that it 
creates a disconnect between individual situations of moral judgment. Although the 
perceptive agent will draw on prior experience and will be able to imagine analogous 
situations for the purpose of comparison and contrast, there is no necessary, underlying 
similarity.
This disconnect happens in two ways. First, Nussbaum’s discussion of the moral 
judgment process is limited to a description of the process. Her emphasis on perception, 
details, incommensurability, and emotions tells us where to look for guidance when 
navigating moral decisions, but it does not guide us through this content. We know
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specifically which data are pertinent, and she tells us that decisions made from acute 
perception are better than those made more bluntly, but she does not provide a foundation 
for judging which of these acutely perceptive decisions is better, other than leaving us to 
assume that a more perceptive decision is better than a less perceptive one.100 Her 
position of perception as morality, then, is fundamentally descriptive, explaining which 
decision process is better, and why, without guiding us as to which decision is itself 
better, and why.101 To make this latter judgment, we need to insert presupposed norms or 
deduce similarity in content from several decisions Nussbaum would deem morally 
correct (begging the question by what norms she deems them correct). Using the method 
she gives us in Love’s Knowledge, we will accumulate a string of decisions made with the 
correct judgment technique, yet without the security of knowing we judged correctly.
Second, because of the descriptive nature of her approach, when Nussbaum 
emphasizes the role of perception to the degree she does, she creates a situation where 
morality’s shape is subject to the shape of individual experiences and an individual’s 
experience, not an integral, foundational component of a greater, human experience.102 A 
new set of particulars, unique either to an individual, or to general history for that matter, 
may dictate a morally correct decision contradictory to one made previously, even if the 
previous decision is still understood as correct at the time of the latter decision. This 
allows both to be morally correct and, at the same time, contradictory. Without 
developing any examples here, a brief consideration of telling “white lies” to avoid 
hurting a person’s feelings at a crucially sensitive moment in his or her life gives us a 
good starting point for understanding how a morally correct decision may differ 
according to circumstances. We may bring some preconceived conception of correct
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judgment regarding truthfulness, honesty, respect, and friendship to the situation, but any 
correct decision will be determinable only after a consideration of the contingencies of 
that situation, including the current and future emotional states of the other party.
Further, and equally important, the judgment we reach will not be repeatable, because the 
details of the situation are not likely to reoccur. Nussbaum addresses this non­
repeatability arising from the uniqueness of a particular decision in her discussion 
distinguishing general and universal principles.103
Together, these two aspects of Nussbaum’s approach reveal the problem that 
arises with her approach. The emphasis on perception and method as the mode for 
determining moral rectitude and a dependence on particulars and uniqueness as moral 
guides narrow the scope of morality. They create a disconnect between individual 
instances of moral judgment such that assurance of moral rectitude is reducible to, and 
limited to, these singular situations. There is an irony here. While reinvigorating the 
moral life by emphasizing the tangible contingencies we know and feel in actual human 
life, Nussbaum actually limits the richness of this moral life by focusing it on the singular 
situation, stripping it of depth and comprehensiveness. This degree of narrowing and 
focusing may not be her intent; however, it is the functional effect of her approach. It 
stands in stark contrast to the abstraction and timelessness of Kant’s approach, yet it does 
not accomplish the thickening of morality as she suggests it does. Instead, we are 
reminded of Hume, both in the emphasis on empirical description and in the lack of 
necessary connection between separate occasions of similar activity. What we can know 
is what we observe, and we can have no assurance that any observation (or moral 
decision) will be repeatable. Because of the restrictions inherent to uniqueness and
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particularity, we can only cross-check with other similar moral decisions, and any overlap 
between them will be on a level of generality only mildly helpful when facing a unique 
situation. In practice, then, Nussbaum leaves us with an empirical reductionism that 
cannot provide us with a sufficient standard for morality as Kant claims is needed in the 
Foundations and as Nussbaum presupposes in her discussion of essentialism.
Two objections in defense of Nussbaum arise here. First, her description of 
dialectical understanding and eventual perceptive equilibrium provides a basis for a 
coherent practical wisdom. Individual decisions are not, then, isolated instances, 
anchorless and subject to contingent circumstances. Rather, a dialectical understanding 
of morality provides the foundation against which we compare and evaluate new 
circumstances. It is a lifelong process, rich in perceptive content and inclusive of our 
mistakes. Future and completely unique circumstances, then, although calling for a 
perceptive judgment singular to the situation, are understood in terms of this accumulated 
practical wisdom. Their ability to redirect morality through their difference is mitigated 
by the accumulation of this lifelong wisdom. Further, and importantly, we do not 
encounter new circumstances and compare them to this understanding solely in a 
calculated, rational way, but we perceive and process with help from the imagination and 
the feeling of the soul. This perceptive dialectic, then, provides a thorough account for 
our understanding of morality.
Second, her approach is, after all, what we do when making moral decisions. She 
accurately represents the most realistic and plausible alternative to academic discussions 
of morality, and she succeeds in presenting “an account of ethical inquiry that will 
capture what we actually do when we ask ourselves the most pressing ethical
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questions.”104 To bring a philosophical, analytical critique to her method places morality 
back into the realm of abstract theory and exhibits exactly what she is rejecting. I will 
address each of these objections here, although the latter depends on the fuller discussion 
in the following section.
Two problems arise with Nussbaum’s discussion of dialectic. In the first place, 
the standard process of dialectic is one of incorporation—sublation into a new whole. 
Application of this standard understanding of dialectic to perception and morality gives 
us an eventual generality rather than a rich equilibrium of incommensurables. We do not 
need to think of this generality as generic; it can still be thick and complex. However, as 
an agent becomes more finely aware and richly responsible, that is, as the moral agent 
dialectically accumulates moral experience and hones her sense of moral perception, her 
approach to moral decisions moves closer to that of applying a general theory. It is 
unavoidable. Even the continually poised agent, who can place each moral decision in 
the context of previously-trained perception and still interpret each additional decision 
freshly, will inevitably make connections and references to successful learning, and, as 
this stock of successful learning increases, the ability to make these connections will 
increase also. A decision arising from keen, thorough, and sympathetic perception need 
not be novel. Nussbaum recognizes this process in the term of a person’s life, but we can 
easily imagine its application to a family, a community, and, eventually, to the succession 
of generations. A perceptive agent will remain aware and does not act from convention. 
Yet, even though one is continually perceptive and aware, each moral decision brings her 
one step closer to an eventually antecedent general theory. This is not what Nussbaum 
wants.
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Therefore, she does not discuss moral decisions in these terms of standard 
dialectic, which leads to the second problem. Instead, as already discussed, she offers us 
a stasis of sorts, which she calls perceptive equilibrium. Here, accumulated moral 
knowledge exists as a body of incommensurable values and experiences— a mosaic that, 
when taken as a whole, contributes to practical wisdom. We compare situations of moral 
decision to this body, finding pieces of similarities and differences that contribute to our 
method of rich perception. In this version of dialectic, incorporation of new experience 
does not occur via sublation, and negativity is not resolved. It is an ever-growing body of 
practical experience and increasing wisdom, where dialectical incorporation consists of 
properly placing a new situation in relation to parts of the accumulated body and that 
maintains the uniqueness of incommensurable values without necessarily resolving them. 
This version works well within the context of Love’s Knowledge, where Nussbaum’s 
emphasis is on the process of moral judgment. Again, however, we are left with the 
problem, beyond the process, of finding a consistent position within the dialectic’s 
resultant equilibrium, both to connect together what already exists and to provide 
guidance for future decisions.
Both versions of dialectic can accommodate conflict, and they can change 
accordingly; neither claims a static, categorical correctness, and they grow according to 
context. They differ in that the result of the standard dialectic process is a new, coherent 
entity. Sublation involves a merging and transformation into a cohesive unit that leaves 
behind the contributing components. Further, it can have a critical mass from which its 
incorporation of a negative position may be to negate it, still transforming itself into a 
new entity. It represents a substantial critical position.
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In contrast, perceptive equilibrium, as Nussbaum describes it, cannot claim such a 
stance. It has no coherent foundation intrinsic to each of its incommensurables grounding 
its array of accumulated moral experiences. To call this body practical wisdom or to 
understand it as a unified, singular set is to place an organizing framework on, or 
subjectively deduce one from, this equilibrium of individually-grounded decisions that 
are the results of individual sets of particulars. Such a framework, however, does not 
represent a necessary coherence that runs like a common thread through all of them.105 
Indeed, the practical wisdom of perceptive equilibrium may contain simultaneous, 
contradictory positions. And this is exactly what Nussbaum wants and what she 
promotes in her discussion of the incommensurability of values. After all, it does reflect 
our lives.
The problem with perceptive equilibrium as a normative position, then, is that it 
contains no inherent cohesion. The organizing framework we are calling morality or 
practical wisdom is one we designate, subjecting it to both competing frameworks and to 
potential future perceptions. Because of the uniqueness resulting from the details of a 
particular moral situation, and because of the unique array of individual moral decisions 
within a single person’s life, there is no reason to suspect that two individuals will 
understand the details of a moral judgment situation in the same way. Subject to 
whatever perceptions perception may bring, an understood conception of morality can be 
dismantled at any time, as Nussbaum describes, by a novel or challenging set of 
particulars.
Here, Nussbaum’s appeal to human essentialism resurfaces as a strong candidate 
for this common thread. Could we not, from this essentialism, recognize commonality
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among all people, thereby assigning an inherent dignity—grounded not in abstractions of 
reason, but in concrete, lived observations of common humanity—to each person? Could 
this not serve as a normative, critical position for organizing and directing the various 
decisions made within a morality of perception? More importantly, could it not only 
unify the experiences of a single person but represent also a substantial foundation for 
relating the moral experiences of different people? As Nussbaum notes in her rejection 
of metaphysical realism, “The failure to take an interest in studying our practices of 
analyzing and reasoning, human and historical as they are, the insistence that we would 
have good arguments only if they came from heaven—all this betrays a shame before the 
human. On the other hand, if we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for 
value as uninteresting and irrelevant, as we should, then the news of its collapse will not 
change the way we do things: it will just let us get on with the business of reasoning in 
which we were already engaged.”106
Initially, it appears that the answer to the above questions is yes. Unless we 
appeal to some conception of metaphysical realism, a morality derived from an internalist 
understanding of humanness will include a starting point similar to Nussbaum’s 
essentialism. However, we can make a distinction within an internalist understanding of 
humanness, one Nussbaum does not make, from which we can offer a foundation for 
morality that does not rely on Nussbaum’s essentialism and presents a final rejection of 
her method. The distinction is subtle, but it is not without a difference, and I will develop 
it further in the next section. For now, however, it observes that, within an internalist 
account of human essentialism, there are two ways to ground morality.
91
Nussbaum overlooks this distinction because, in her emphasis on an internalist 
understanding of humanness that is motivated by a rejection of any claims of a 
metaphysics, she fails to consider the force of material context when describing her 
account of internalist essentialism. Similar to her critique of the Academy’s default 
acceptance of relativism as the only alternative to metaphysical realism, she too, in her 
rejection of a metaphysical realism, moves too far away from the position she rejects. 
Although she argues for a normative position grounded in essentialism and revealed 
through perception, thus contrasting it with both relativism and metaphysical realism, the 
primary role she gives to perception places too much emphasis on the subjective 
interpretation of this understanding. The distinction she overlooks, then, notes that 
within a position of internalist essentialism we may also emphasize the force of the 
material context without stepping away from perception into abstract metaphysical 
realism.
Once we note this distinction between two emphases within an internalist account 
of human essentialism, we can make two objections that provide a final rejection of 
Nussbaum’s account of essentialism and her method’s connection to it while still 
allowing us to preserve an internalist account of essentialism. Each of the two objections 
reveals where Nussbaum’s emphasis on the subjective interpretation of an internalist 
essentialism falls short. Each also suggests where a greater emphasis on the material 
context of this internalist understanding would avoid the shortcomings of Nussbaum’s 
method. The first objection claims that Nussbaum’s account of essentialism cannot 
provide a substantive base to ground and connect the various instances of individual 
perceptions because this essentialism itself is subjective and susceptible to redefinition.
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The second objection observes that Nussbaum’s account of essentialism can offer 
grounding only within a social context and fails to offer a foundation for moral guidance 
when we are alone. In the remainder of this section, I will address these two objections 
to Nussbaum’s account, explaining for each why it presents difficulty for her method. In 
the next section, I will offer an alternate approach to grounding a theory of morality that 
relies on the material emphasis of the distinction within an internalist account of 
humanness.
As described in this section, Nussbaum offers a description of essentialism to both 
establish a foundation for a method of moral decision making and counter the default 
relativism that accompanies a rejection of metaphysical realism. However, her 
discussion struggles to provide a basis for continuity between moral decisions. Her 
account of essentialism, understood internally, falls short of its grounding role because 
this essentialism is itself subject to perception.
For Nussbaum, the locus of moral judgment within an internalist understanding of 
humanity rests with perception. It is, thus, ultimately the product not only of the details 
of a particular situation, but also of a perceiver’s filtering understanding of these details. 
As described in the previous section, in her emphasis on perception Nussbaum rejects the 
use of prior formulations for moral guidance. However, without an underlying orienting 
framework, particulars do not give guidance unless we subjectively interpret overlaps and 
similarities among those particulars as “morality.” The difficulty with this approach, of 
particular import here, is that the perceiver’s ability to interpret those details is not itself a 
constant. It, too, is a contingent detail of a particular situation. To depend on the 
perceiver’s ability to perceive, orient, and interpret places great faith in each member of
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humanity and assumes sufficient perspicacity on the part of all perceivers. Yet, 
Nussbaum herself admits that, at times, even the most perceptive agent will lose focus 
when immersed in the full experience of a moment, resulting in perceptive oscillation. 
We can only imagine what perception by others, such as those raised in negligent 
households who do not know the security and depth of loving relationships, might look 
like.
This problem of subjective perception creates problems for an essentialism 
derived from within an internalist understanding, because a conception of essentialism is 
itself, even as Nussbaum describes it, subject to interpretation and therefore cannot 
provide a rebuttal to a critique of subjectivism. In other words, although Nussbaum’s 
conception of essentialism appears to be sufficient and solid, if this understanding of 
human essentialism changes radically, then we are left holding on to nothing. There is, 
then, a further level on which subjective perception is problematic in addition to the role 
it plays in individual decisions. If a major transition occurs in our understanding of 
human essentialism, through which we understand human-qua-human in a way that does 
not coincide with Nussbaum’s description of essentialism, then the coherence provided 
by her essentialism can no longer serve as a substantial normative foundation for our 
otherwise distinct moral situations. Nussbaum leaves morality exposed to the peril of the 
potential of a radically changed understanding of humanness.
Yet, who can disagree with her conception of essentialism? Here, Nussbaum’s 
discussion of essentialism reveals her contextual position in history. That is, it fits now, 
offering a sufficient and solid account for humanness. Were this understanding of 
humanness to change— as the rapid progression of technological innovation suggests
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could happen—this “business of reasoning in which we were already engaged” could 
look very different.
At the end of “Aristotelian Essentialism,” she offers a short narrative myth about 
essentialism, in which another planet houses human-like creatures that descended long 
ago from humans. They lack several features Nussbaum considers essentially human, 
and, therefore, we are led to conclude that they are not human. Specifically, in addition 
to physical differences, they “have discarded—not just in theory but in the fabric of their 
daily lives—the Earthly tendencies of thought that link the perception of one’s neighbor’s 
pain to the memory of one’s own and the perception of a stranger’s pain to the experience 
of a neighbor’s, all this through the general idea of the human being and human 
flourishing.”107
This story accomplishes two goals for Nussbaum. First, it demonstrates in 
narrative what she has described in the previous pages of the essay. Second, it allows her 
to argue that her version of essentialism is correct; any other compilation of features, as 
exhibited by these other creatures, would not be that of humans. Her approach to 
morality, then, is applicable to us, as humans, for it coincides inextricably with this 
essentialism. It is evident that we do not hold the inhabitants of this other planet to our 
moral standards—our moral understanding does not apply—because they are not human. 
In this, she presents a circular argument for her thesis, claiming that, as long as conditions 
are as they are, then our moral obligations are as she has explained.
A little thought experiment, however, reveals a problem with her story. If we do 
not give these creatures physical appearances different from ours and we do not place 
them on another planet, but, rather, we distinguish a subset of people via another
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characteristic Nussbaum considers essential, then we have a grave problem. Consider, 
for example, the no longer distant and unimaginable potentials of biotechnology. Future 
parents already have the ability to select for certain genetic features; what if abnormally- 
extended lifespans were an option for those who could afford it? The gap between the 
wealthiest and poorest citizens of the world, even within the United States, is such that it 
is not impossible to imagine such physical enhancements for some and not for others. 
What if these people sought to associate only with others in a similar condition? What if, 
after many years, they began to understand themselves as different? What if they chose 
to reproduce primarily with each other? Although this may seem extreme, we can easily 
project the potentials of this near-future technology, and we can extrapolate from other 
situations where we have become acclimated to an otherwise repugnant concept. It does 
not require a cynical mind to suggest that the potential for profitability, mixed with 
proper marketing and lobbying, can transform previously held standards.
Memory altering drugs are another recent technology.. What if those who could 
afford it could selectively remove certain memories? Although we currently direct this 
developing technology toward those who have faced extreme circumstances, such as 
abuse, rape, or war trauma, we can easily imagine where market forces would eventually 
broaden the tolerable application of this technology. If we extrapolate from the currently 
broadening application of pain medications, we can imagine where memory altering 
drugs, designed for a specific, well-intentioned use, could also become easily accessible.
The past seventy-five years of our human history has seen several instances of 
attempted genocide. Why should it seem distant that a select group of humans could 
begin to see themselves, through genetic enhancement or selective memory, as different
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from others? By removing recognized kinship, they are not human by Nussbaum’s 
definition. The point here is not science fiction. Rather, it is to show that a one-eyed 
race of giants on another planet misguides Nussbaum in framing her example. Instead, if 
we imagine two different groups of people existing on the same planet, one of which 
defines itself outside the parameters of the moral legislation derived from Nussbaum’s 
conception of human essentialism, then the two groups are not bound by the same 
obligations. We, instead, find ourselves back at Bernard Williams’ discussion of moral 
skepticism. What if a group of people, specifically those who through their ability to 
access the technologies above have distinguished themselves from the rest, simply opt 
out? To what do we appeal without shared essentialism?
The second objection also becomes visible when we make a distinction between 
the emphases in an internalist understanding of human essentialism. In Love’s 
Knowledge and “Aristotelian Essentialism,” Nussbaum’s description of moral decisions 
has a notable bias. She provides an effective method for navigating, through careful 
perception, the ethics of human relations. She describes how to approach unique, 
individual situations calling for moral judgment, including the appropriateness of our 
personal, emotional responses to the decision. She also describes the threshold of human 
essentialism to guide us through decisions of broader policy, both within a single 
government and for use internationally. In both contexts, unique, individual situations 
and broader policy, she focuses her discussion of morality on human relationships. How 
do I respond toward this person in this particular situation? How do I act sensitively 
given this other person’s needs? How do we protect the dignity of a particular social 
class in light of hundreds of years of established, cultural discrimination?
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In this context of relationships, Nussbaum’s work is to be commended for 
properly retrieving morality from abstract realms and reinstating it as a human function. 
After all, if we cannot justify an act of generosity with love, or sympathy, rather than 
reason, we function robotically and apart from a major aspect of our lives. However, 
Nussbaum limits her discussion of morality to human relations only, and the problems of 
sufficient grounding for her theory become especially clear when we change the context 
for perception as morality.
That is, both her discussion of perception as morality and her description of 
human essentialism do not give us any suggestions for guiding our moral lives when we 
are alone. As I discussed in the introduction, the gravitas we associate with morality is 
particularly manifest in the presence of others, but the situation is different when we are 
by ourselves.
When we are alone, perception as morality fails us, for there is no greater 
accountability for our perception—no other person or broader context to serve as a foil 
for our interpretation of our perceived needs. Alone, I am free to perceive, in as much 
sensitive detail as possible, that today’s installment of Oprah is more suited to my 
particular needs at this time than is a walk through the winter hills behind my house. I 
am free to take my moral cues from Nora Roberts rather than Henry James—perhaps for 
reasons as basic as the accessibility of the prose of each. In the same way that the 
particular details of an individual situation involving human interaction dictate our 
decisions, such as navigating the gradations of truth and white lies, so also the details of a 
situation where we are alone guide our decisions. The crucial difference, however, is that 
decisions made in response to contingencies within the context of relationships have their
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focus somewhere other than on me solely. If I have had a long day at work, I am still 
responsible to the other person in the common moral space we share. Alone, after a long 
day, however, weariness may be the primary factor influencing my perception of my 
needs.
There is no need to elaborate this further. What Nussbaum gives us is a thorough 
account for perception and moral judgments within the context of relationship, and any 
consideration of the moral life when I am alone reveals her method to be lacking. The 
reason for this lack is her method’s ultimate grounding in subjective perception.
Both objections become evident only when we make a distinction within an 
internalist understanding of human essentialism. We may, as Nussbaum does, emphasize 
subjective perception as the mode of understanding our morality, but this exposes an 
account of essentialism to the vagueness of our perceptions, relinquishing a conception of 
essentialism to changed understandings of humanness. It also fails to provide moral 
guidance when we are alone. If, however, we make this distinction within internalist 
essentialism, recognizing subjective perceptions as fitting into a broader context that is 
itself still an internalist conception, then we can provide a more sufficient and substantial 
basis for moral guidance without reaching into metaphysical realism.
The need, then, is to begin with Nussbaum’s redirection of the moral focus from 
abstract realms to the concrete particulars of our daily lives, but to develop it in a way 
that does not reduce a conception of morality to the individual situations calling for moral 
judgment. By placing perception in a broader material context, we respond to each of the 
two objections, providing an internalist account of essentialism less subjective than 
Nussbaum’s and able to provide moral guidance when we are alone.
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9. Alternative Position: Centered Coherence
Any critique must depart from some initial position. Here, I have critiqued Kant’s 
approach to moral theory for its abstraction from the experience he sought to guide. His 
position is ultimately one of rational reductionism. Although I hold that Nussbaum’s 
alternative closely resembles our tangible process of moral judgment, I have also 
presented the argument that her approach is one of empirical reductionism. Were I to 
stop here, it would appear from these two critiques that I reject any kind of moral 
reductionism. This is not the case.
As I described in the introduction, we understand the presence of morality in our
lives. Whether, in our grasp of morality, we see this is a dichotomous moral, not-moral
position or the more holistic question “How should one live?” we recognize some
distinction between actions that are better and actions that are worse. We approve of
individual actions and social policies while scorning others. We readily recognize acts of
kindness and examples of courage, both public and private, and we readily disapprove of
cruelty and laziness, both public and private. Again, whether we attribute this
recognition to social conditioning or some greater metaphysics, it is the case that we
108possess some conception of morality and a corresponding sense of value. This 
conception is something to which we attribute significant gravity and, importantly, is one 
we are willing to defend.
This gravity and defense encourage reduction in morality. In order to back up our 
moral positions, which represent some of our most deeply held beliefs, we seek the 
decisive foundation of an Archimedean point, that which is unquestionable. For Kant, 
this is the a priori, universal, and necessary realm of reason. For Nussbaum, this point is
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known a posteriori in the concrete particulars of shared human experience and ultimately 
defined in the details of each experience. The reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum are 
similar in that they both focus, although with very different emphases, on single 
moments. The moment of decision for Kant is so narrow in its scope that an agent is 
morally accountable for the judgment itself only, and there is no accountability for the 
agent’s success in enacting the decision. Moral judgment for Nussbaum focuses on the 
particular details of a single decision, limiting both the moral moment and a greater 
conception of a moral whole to the particular situation at hand. By emphasizing concrete 
particulars, Nussbaum does offer a richer reductionism than Kant. Her characteristic 
phrase “finely aware and richly responsible” suggests more than the rhetoric of moral 
obligation, but even this more robust account cannot respond to the two objections I 
raised in the previous section.
As an alternative to the reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum, I would like to 
sketch how we might think differently about reductionism. My position is reductionist in 
that, if pressed, it will claim a defendable foundation. However, it differs from the 
reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum in that it seeks a broader foundation; it is reducible 
to an Archimedean whole, rather than a point. Its locus is not the narrow, abstracted 
realm of reason; it is likewise not the narrow, though rich, set of details defining a 
particular situation. Rather, it seeks to combine these in a way that gathers the individual 
perceptions known to us through experience under a common banner of cohesion. 
Importantly, this moral foundation is a theme that courses through these various 
experiences, and not an interpretive framework we assign to them in reflection.
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I will proceed with the awareness that the following discussion will be tentative. 
This comes partly from the incomplete nature of a sketch, and partly because it borrows 
from other, established systems. Kant’s system of morality received much of its strength 
from the underlying logical consistency of his greater metaphysics. Transcendental logic 
works as a whole; it is irresponsible to simply remove a section for use elsewhere. Thus, 
where borrowing occurs, it will be done selectively and carefully in an attempt to avoid 
this carelessness.
This alternate perspective begins with a consideration of the following two 
statements:
• Our perceptive actions have meanings (and we may connect them into a 
greater whole).
• A perceptive action has meaning because it is part of a greater whole.
These statements have several similarities. Both recognize meaning and value as
revealed through experience. Both are consistent with a position of internalist 
essentialism. (The latter, although resembling claims of metaphysical realism, does not 
depend on the existence of a universal and timeless in-itself or on any form of the 
transcendental.)
The first statement represents Nussbaum’s perceptive equilibrium, where 
decisions are made in response to particulars and overarching coherence is secondary. 
Concrete perceptions “hang beautifully together” as an equilibrium that is “always ready 
to reconstitute itself in response to the new.”
The second statement implies something more. It too is essentialist. That is, it 
agrees with Nussbaum’s statement that the “deepest examination of human history and
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human cognition from within still reveals a more or less determinate account of the 
human being, one that divides its essential from its accidental properties.”109 This 
position differs from Nussbaum, however, on the basis of the distinction mentioned in the 
previous section. It rejects an internalist conception of morality that is inseparable from 
perception. A position that does not seek a foundation apart from perception defers its 
composition to this perception, for it lacks an intrinsic cohesiveness and critical 
standpoint that can appeal to that cohesiveness. Instead, I suggest that the distinction be 
made, within an internalist understanding of humanness, grounding this understanding in 
a subjective and an objective component. The former does not suggest abstraction or 
relativism; the latter does not rely on metaphysical realism. Rather, the latter seeks a 
broader foundation for this essentialism, one that can provide moral guidance when we 
are alone as well as when we are in relationship and that can contest arbitrary or changing 
conceptions of humanness.
There is a recognized trade off here. Kant’s system, although abstract, provides 
an absolute foundation. Nussbaum’s method, although lacking the cohesiveness of 
Kant’s system, grounds morality securely in the most tangibly-known aspects of our 
experience. By remaining somewhat distant from both, this alternate reductionism, 
paradoxically, relinquishes the full security provided by these two other methods. It 
instead brings us back into Bernard Williams’ discussion, where we realize morality is a 
different game.
In “The Moral First Aid Manual,” Daniel Dennett describes what a guide for 
morality might look like. Regarding the issue of security, he states, “One cannot expect 
there to be a single stable solution to such a design problem, but rather a variety of
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uncertain and temporary equilibria, with the conversation-stoppers tending to accrete 
pearly layers of supporting dogma which themselves cannot withstand extended scmtiny, 
but which do actually serve on occasion, blessedly, to deflect and terminate 
consideration.” At first, this sounds quite a bit like Nussbaum, but he continues: “It 
might seem then that ‘rule worship’ of a certain kind is a good thing, at least for agents 
designed like us. It is good not because there is a certain rule, or set of rules, which is 
provably the best, or which always yields the right answer, but because having rules 
works— somewhat—and not having rules doesn’t work at all.”110 We need rules, norms, 
or landmarks. Williams suggests in the postscript to Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy 
that we begin with truth, truthfulness, and the meaning of an individual life. That is, 
while we must recognize the shifts and rearrangements of the furniture within morality as 
we gain deeper understandings of ourselves through perception, science, and experience, 
we must also identify and rank those pieces of furniture, recognizing that rearrangement 
and refinishing is different from claiming that all pieces of furniture are equally 
important. Not having rules or landmarks from which to gain orientation does not work.
Bernard Williams suggests that we consider rationality as one such piece of 
furniture, although the skeptic or the dogmatist, functioning autonomously apart from any 
moral norm, may simply choose to be irrational. I suggest instead, in keeping with 
Nussbaum, that a moral outlook does not overemphasize rationality, but instead borrows 
a concept related to rationality: coherence. This does not reach for the categorical 
universality of Kantian morality, and it recognizes perceptive equilibrium and oscillation 
as lacking the unification required for sufficient guidance. In exchange for the security
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otherwise provided by rational or empirical reductionism, it offers a broad but definable 
concept, coherence known in experience.
The following is a sketch of some tenets for coherence as a foundation for 
morality. I will discuss two components of this. First, I will discuss how coherence 
functions within an internalist understanding of humanness and how it establishes 
standards while being receptive to rich perception. Second, I will discuss where we need 
to,look for guidance in delineating a morality of coherence.
A position of coherence is ultimately reductionist, but, importantly, its does not 
narrow to a single point. By its essence, it is a whole; the locus of a morality focused on 
coherence reaches outside human nature. This does not mean it is distinct from human 
nature, only that human nature, and its perception, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for grounding it. Here, a distinction made by Hannah Arendt is helpful. In The 
Human Condition, she separates human nature from the human condition, noting that 
“the sum total of human activities and capabilities which correspond to the human 
condition does not constitute anything like human nature.”111 In making this distinction, 
she notes that human nature—the essentialism Nussbaum discusses—is insufficient for 
describing the human life. Rather, a full account must recognize that human life is 
contained within a material context. She states, “The human condition comprehends 
more than the conditions under which life has been given to [humanity].. . .  Whatever 
touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the 
character of a condition of human experience.” Further, “Whatever enters the human 
world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human 
condition.. . .  The objectivity of the world—its object- or thing-character—and the
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human condition supplement each other; because human existence is conditioned 
existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated 
articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human experience.”112
From this, we can better understand the subjective-objective distinction within an 
internalist understanding of humanness and therefore morality. We do not live in a 
timeless universe, as Kant has it, nor does our understanding of morality reside in the 
context of human-to-human relations only or in the confines of an individual situation. 
Rather, morality, as related to the full context of humanness, must address the greater 
human condition. Its foundation must be one where the emphasis does not rest with a 
subjective interpretation of perception.
For this reason, coherence gives us a good starting place. Importantly, we must 
recognize at the outset that this coherence becomes visible in a phenomenological 
description. It is understood internally and does not appeal to a metaphysical foundation. 
Importantly, it represents a conception of the good and can thus serve as an orienting 
framework. We can define this coherence both negatively and positively.
Negatively, it recognizes strong dissonance in our lives as significant and 
problematic, a deviation from the understood good. This is not an appeal to the complete 
unification of experience; periods of perceptive equilibrium are allowed. However, if 
morality is to provide guidance, then coherence as a moral position cannot offer a blanket 
acceptance of dissonance in the name of incommensurability and Nussbaumian dialectic. 
For example, we have a strong scientific understanding of what human physical health 
looks like and what diminishes this health or adds to it. Certain foods and activities, 
whose independent values we may perceive to be worthwhile to us and in certain contexts
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may be acceptable and even good, are incommensurable with this overall conception of 
health. A moral discussion must be able to name a generally sedentary lifestyle, a diet of 
frozen, processed lunches and suppers, or non-genetic obesity as dissonant with the 
coherence of health in accord with our physical and psychological needs. Given our 
known description of human overall health, derived from an internalist understanding of 
humanness but grounded more broadly (in science also rather than in subjective 
perception only), we would never condone such a lack of activity and unhealthy diet. 
Instead, we could name and prescribe certain actions and behaviors as better.
Positively, coherence represents the phenomenological experience and 
understanding of participation in something greater than that which is immediately 
apparent. Again, this is known in experience and does not appeal to a separate 
metaphysical reality. It functions along the concept of synergy, where the whole of the 
experience is qualitatively different than the sum of its parts, and is evident as a sense of 
transcendence. This transcendence need not be religious or spiritual (although it does not 
dismiss the validity of religion). We know it in the experience of art, both for the 
performer or creator and the observer. We know it in the exuberance of mind and body 
after a strenuous physical activity. We know it in the midst of an overwhelming natural 
landscape, whether grandiose or utterly simple. We know it in the emotions of love, hurt, 
and sympathy a person comes to be present in. Importantly, in all of these, we recognize 
that content comes from the intrinsic dignity of a greater setting. Neither the perceiver 
nor the context solely defines the moment by itself, and only together do they describe 
the full experience.
107
From these negative and positive sketches of coherence as a foundation for a 
conception of morality, we can see how a centered and situated coherence might provide 
a valid alternative to the reductionisms of Kant and Nussbaum. In contrast to it, we see 
how dry Kant’s reductionism really is. Although he provides a foundation that is 
seemingly categorical and universal, it removes us from those aspects of our lives we find 
most powerful. Our physical bodies and emotional intelligences contribute too 
significantly to our understanding of value to be ignored. We also see how Nussbaum’s 
method of perception as morality focuses too narrowly on details and thus cannot provide 
sufficient guidance within relationships and fails to address our moral lives as anything 
other than perceptual. As an alternative to the rejection of these two systems, centered 
coherence offers an outlook on our moral lives that reflects the tangible details we 
actually experience while offering sufficient landmarks for navigation. It can define what 
is immoral, both when we are in relationship and when we are alone, and it can also offer 
a conception of the good beyond what is blameless. It recognizes individual value and 
incommensurability, but it can still define some standard by which certain 
incommensurables, perhaps those that remain perpetually unresolved, are understood as 
blameworthy.
In exchange for this comprehensiveness, it offers a foundation that is not clearly 
demonstrable. This foundation is sufficiently competent to reach into all aspects of our 
lives, and, within these, it can provide detailed accounts of bad, good, and better. 
However, situated coherence as a moral starting point, as a conception of the good, 
represents the Archimedean foundation of a broad whole, not a definable point or set of
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points. It is not clearly definable like reason, and it is not concretely identifiable like 
tangible details.
As a conception of the good, situated coherence provides, within an internalist 
understanding of humanness and in the context of concrete particulars, an orienting 
framework. It is teleological. This teleology need not be a Hegelian progression, and it 
need not be one of movement, but it has directional emphasis. It claims better and worse, 
this and not that, and in each case can state why. It can recognize deviations from this 
conception of the good, including shifting understandings of humanness. If morality’s 
role is to provide guidance among the contingencies of lived experience, then it must be 
able to offer orientation, not just a method for perception. This is why Kant includes the 
“Kingdom of Ends” expression of the moral law. It is an attempt to provide an orienting 
framework for the categorical imperative to save it from the critique of emptiness, while
113at the same time avoiding contingencies and heteronomy. Morality is not arbitrary, 
and a grounding of coherence provides sufficient stability from which to provide 
guidance. From within an internalist conception of humanness, it can name what is good 
and thus guide our action.
Beginning with coherence, then, we can offer guidance for rich perception. We 
can navigate the contingent details of a moral decision, still paying close attention to the 
uniqueness of the situation. Yet, within this approach, morality’s shape is not dependent 
on these details. On the other hand, this guidance is not a general, one size fits all 
method. Rather, grounded coherence is an inherent quality of our internal conception of 
humanness, and it reflects the significance and gravity we experience in our moral lives 
as well as the comprehensive context—both individual details and broader connections—
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in which we live. This ability of coherence to provide a blend of gravity, orientation, and 
perception can be seen most notably in centering acts of grace, such as the Bishop of 
Digne’s response in Les Miserables when Jean Valjean is found to have his silver or in 
the Christian Gospels when Jesus prevents the stoning of the woman caught in 
adultery.114 Each of these actions arises from close perception of the particulars and is 
incommensurable with a general mode of moral judgment (a system of exceptions to the 
rule defeats the point of rules). Yet, these decisions are not dependent, secondary 
responses to the particulars. Rather, each decision constitutes a greater conception of the 
good, the center of a coherent spiritual whole for the person receiving the act of grace. 
Each exhibits all the gravity, emotion, sensitive perception, and wholeness we want in 
morality.
How do we begin to understand this coherence? How do we define and set its 
parameters? Where do we look for its orientating landmarks? Coherence complies with 
an internalist understanding of humanness. Even though it seeks a more objective 
foundation than perception, it too connects up with the immediacy of human experience. 
A source, sufficiently compelling and content-rich is needed. As these two examples 
suggest, and as Nussbaum shows in her organic-connection thesis, narrative offers a 
strong starting place. However, since coherence, and not narrative per say, is the 
objective, one place we might look is the genre of grand narrative. Grand narratives 
traditionally provided and, for many non-technologic ally advanced societies and religious 
and social groups today, still provide the meta-level framework for orienting our 
knowledge, including our morals. Hegel, for example, gives us one of the more 
celebrated grand narratives—dialectics of Spirit—within philosophy. Others include the
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“hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the 
creation of wealth.”115 Likewise the dominant religious texts also offer similar grand 
narratives. Lyotard defines grand narrative as a narrative with a “legitimating 
function.”116 They require no further justification for their legitimization.
I refer to the use of grand narratives carefully and tentatively; Lyotard defines 
grand narrative because he critiques it. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, he traces the relationship of science and technology to knowledge, describing 
the breakdown of science’s claims to legitimacy and the resultant dissolution of the grand 
narrative within contemporary capitalist society. He explains,
Legitimation is the process by which a “legislator” dealing with scientific 
discourse is authorised [sic] to prescribe the stated conditions (in general, 
conditions of internal consistency and experimental verification) 
determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for 
consideration by the scientific community.. . .  The question of the 
legitimacy of science has been indissociably linked to that of the 
legitimation of the legislator since the time of Plato. From this point of 
view, the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to 
decide what is just, even if the statements consigned to these two 
authorities differ in nature. The point is that there is a strict interlinkage 
between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and 
politics: they both stem from the same perspective, the same “choice” if 
you will.117
I l l
Lyotard notably defined postmodernism as characterized by “incredulity toward
metanarratives,” and we do not have to be fans of his to accept his rejection of grand 
118narratives. Further, we do not need to view the flux of language games Lyotard 
proposes—perceptive equilibrium on a global scale—as a helpful alternative.119 Rather, 
Lyotard’s role is important in recognizing the difficulties in establishing a single meta­
narrative and critiquing the tendency of such narratives, from within their framework of 
self-legitimization, to make claims of universality.
Thus, I do not suggest that we blindly accept any given one as the official, 
definitive statement of human morality, but that we examine the primary function of 
these narratives, their provision of orientation and their resultant relation to coherence. 
Even though a singular, universal grand narrative cannot be legitimized, this does not 
diminish the fact that the individual attempts at such a narrative accurately reflect much 
of our internalist understandings of humanness. That said, a full discussion of grand 
narrative requires adequate consideration of critical theory. I will save such a discussion 
for a later time, but not without noting that criticism is either arbitrary and aimless or it 
too departs from some cohesive center, however distant.
Grand narrative takes several forms, and from these forms we can understand 
their orienting role, as well as begin to establish some basic criteria for wading through 
their many claims. A grand narrative can represent and explain the metaphysical 
worldview of a particular cultural group or broader society, such as can be found in the 
creation stories of pre-technological societies. It can, as in the case of nationalism, tell 
the story of a people, thus providing a sense of pride and belonging. A grand narrative 
can, in the case of an institution such as democratic government, provide a
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comprehensive foundation for a wide array of policies and activities, and it can, as with 
science, offer a validated, provable perspective. As the text of a religion, grand narrative 
can follow the life of a single person, such as Jesus of Nazareth or Mohammed, unifying 
various precepts under a single banner, or it can tell the story of a people, such as the 
ancient Hebrews. Important to their role of orientation, grand narratives are not 
individual snippets of narrative; they are not equivalent to myths, fables, stories, or 
individual pieces of fiction. Rather, they seek to make connections between events and to 
provide explanation, not just description. They thus orient us in moral space, offering us 
a significant level of coherence.120 This orientation and meta-level connectivity 
distinguishes them from the role individual works fiction, as passages or full texts, play in 
perception.
Certain characteristics make grand narratives good starting places. First, as 
narratives, they can include a rich array of context and details. They incorporate these 
concrete tangibles into their accounts as inherent attributes—context is the nature of 
narrative—reflecting key aspects of human life known and validated through experience. 
Nussbaum provides full explanation of the value of this. Beyond Nussbaum’s 
explanation, however, grand narratives provide a mode for relating perception to broader 
context.
As narratives, however, they are told; that is, there is a voice to the teller. Lyotard
describes the subject in the telling of a narrative as “obligated in the way of a relay that
10 1may not keep its charge but must pass it on.” For Lyotard, this telling is a diminution 
and anti-privileging of the subject, and we can agree that it spreads the locus of the moral 
moment away from the teller of the story. In arguing this, Lyotard sought to reduce the
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autonomous role of the subject and thus the ability to claim the superiority of any 
particular narrative over others. However, the telling of a narrative also subjects the 
account to the occasional twists and turns of the speaker. There is, then, a flexibility 
within grand narratives. Although they are meta-level accounts, they must reflect our 
internalist understandings of humanness; they must be communicable, emanating from 
the teller and resonating with their recipients.
As stated, this is a sketch. It is incomplete in its telling, and there are many 
problems and objections to be dealt with at a later time. The primary objection, however, 
notes that there are many grand narratives, requiring us not only to choose among them 
but also to explain how we made this choice. If grand narratives reflect our internalist 
understandings of humanness according to a situated teller and recipient, then they take 
us right back into the problem of subjectivism, only on the larger scale of orienting 
worldview.
To address this objection, we can begin by noting that anyone who is able to 
provide necessary and sufficient moral norms must speak from within some centered 
coherence. This position may be vague or incompletely understood, but it still provides 
the required grounding for understanding a robust and generally orienting morality. 
Importantly, a centered coherence is a position we have chosen. Although we interact 
with, and are influenced by, our material environment, we are not controlled by it, and we 
act autonomously within it.
The problem of plurality remains, however. Even though grand narratives arise 
from positions of centered coherence and help us identify the important landmarks within 
them, the grounding of grand narratives within a centered coherence still leaves the
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problem of a pluralism of centered coherence. To take an account of essentialism, such 
as Nussbaum’s, and make it complete by integrating it with its material context, in 
whatever particular form this context takes, inevitably results in this type of pluralism. 
However, the key difference between this pluralism and the pluralism of an anti- 
essentialist relativism is that each instance of centered coherence offers both the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to construct a substantial, grounded, and non-arbitrary 
moral orientation. A pluralism of centered coherence does not, then, resemble at all the 
arbitrariness of pluralistic relativism.
After recognizing this crucial difference, the important next step is to identify the 
various instances of centered coherence and begin a careful conversation across the 
borders of our moral universes.
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